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<title>Secure Apache HBase</title>
<section xml:id="hbase.secure.configuration">
<title>Secure Client Access to Apache HBase</title>
<para>Newer releases of Apache HBase (&gt;= 0.92) support optional SASL authentication of clients<footnote><para>See
also Matteo Bertozzi's article on <link xlink:href="http://www.cloudera.com/blog/2012/09/understanding-user-authentication-and-authorization-in-apache-hbase/">Understanding User Authentication and Authorization in Apache HBase</link>.</para></footnote>.</para>
<para>This describes how to set up Apache HBase and clients for connection to secure HBase resources.</para>
<section><title>Prerequisites</title>
<para>
You need to have a working Kerberos KDC.
</para>
<para>
A HBase configured for secure client access is expected to be running
on top of a secured HDFS cluster. HBase must be able to authenticate
to HDFS services. HBase needs Kerberos credentials to interact with
the Kerberos-enabled HDFS daemons. Authenticating a service should be
done using a keytab file. The procedure for creating keytabs for HBase
service is the same as for creating keytabs for Hadoop. Those steps
are omitted here. Copy the resulting keytab files to wherever HBase
Master and RegionServer processes are deployed and make them readable
only to the user account under which the HBase daemons will run.
</para>
<para>
A Kerberos principal has three parts, with the form
<code>username/fully.qualified.domain.name@YOUR-REALM.COM</code>. We
recommend using <code>hbase</code> as the username portion.
</para>
<para>
The following is an example of the configuration properties for
Kerberos operation that must be added to the
<code>hbase-site.xml</code> file on every server machine in the
cluster. Required for even the most basic interactions with a
secure Hadoop configuration, independent of HBase security.
</para>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
<property>
<name>hbase.regionserver.kerberos.principal</name>
<value>hbase/_HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM</value>
</property>
<property>
<name>hbase.regionserver.keytab.file</name>
<value>/etc/hbase/conf/keytab.krb5</value>
</property>
<property>
<name>hbase.master.kerberos.principal</name>
<value>hbase/_HOST@YOUR-REALM.COM</value>
</property>
<property>
<name>hbase.master.keytab.file</name>
<value>/etc/hbase/conf/keytab.krb5</value>
</property>
]]></programlisting>
<para>
Each HBase client user should also be given a Kerberos principal. This
principal should have a password assigned to it (as opposed to a
keytab file). The client principal's <code>maxrenewlife</code> should
be set so that it can be renewed enough times for the HBase client
process to complete. For example, if a user runs a long-running HBase
client process that takes at most 3 days, we might create this user's
principal within <code>kadmin</code> with: <code>addprinc -maxrenewlife
3days</code>
</para>
<para>
Long running daemons with indefinite lifetimes that require client
access to HBase can instead be configured to log in from a keytab. For
each host running such daemons, create a keytab with
<code>kadmin</code> or <code>kadmin.local</code>. The procedure for
creating keytabs for HBase service is the same as for creating
keytabs for Hadoop. Those steps are omitted here. Copy the resulting
keytab files to where the client daemon will execute and make them
readable only to the user account under which the daemon will run.
</para>
</section>
<section><title>Server-side Configuration for Secure Operation</title>
<para>
Add the following to the <code>hbase-site.xml</code> file on every server machine in the cluster:
</para>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
<property>
<name>hbase.security.authentication</name>
<value>kerberos</value>
</property>
<property>
<name>hbase.security.authorization</name>
<value>true</value>
</property>
<property>
<name>hbase.coprocessor.region.classes</name>
<value>org.apache.hadoop.hbase.security.token.TokenProvider</value>
</property>
]]></programlisting>
<para>
A full shutdown and restart of HBase service is required when deploying
these configuration changes.
</para>
</section>
<section><title>Client-side Configuration for Secure Operation</title>
<para>
Add the following to the <code>hbase-site.xml</code> file on every client:
</para>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
<property>
<name>hbase.security.authentication</name>
<value>kerberos</value>
</property>
]]></programlisting>
<para>
The client environment must be logged in to Kerberos from KDC or
keytab via the <code>kinit</code> command before communication with
the HBase cluster will be possible.
</para>
<para>
Be advised that if the <code>hbase.security.authentication</code>
in the client- and server-side site files do not match, the client will
not be able to communicate with the cluster.
</para>
<para>
Once HBase is configured for secure RPC it is possible to optionally
configure encrypted communication. To do so, add the following to the
<code>hbase-site.xml</code> file on every client:
</para>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
<property>
<name>hbase.rpc.protection</name>
<value>privacy</value>
</property>
]]></programlisting>
<para>
This configuration property can also be set on a per connection basis.
Set it in the <code>Configuration</code> supplied to
<code>HTable</code>:
</para>
<programlisting>
Configuration conf = HBaseConfiguration.create();
conf.set("hbase.rpc.protection", "privacy");
HTable table = new HTable(conf, tablename);
</programlisting>
<para>
Expect a ~10% performance penalty for encrypted communication.
</para>
</section>
<section><title>Client-side Configuration for Secure Operation - Thrift Gateway</title>
<para>
Add the following to the <code>hbase-site.xml</code> file for every Thrift gateway:
<programlisting><![CDATA[
<property>
<name>hbase.thrift.keytab.file</name>
<value>/etc/hbase/conf/hbase.keytab</value>
</property>
<property>
<name>hbase.thrift.kerberos.principal</name>
<value>$USER/_HOST@HADOOP.LOCALDOMAIN</value>
<!-- TODO: This may need to be HTTP/_HOST@<REALM> and _HOST may not work.
You may have to put the concrete full hostname.
-->
</property>
]]></programlisting>
</para>
<para>
Substitute the appropriate credential and keytab for $USER and $KEYTAB
respectively.
</para>
<para>In order to use the Thrift API principal to interact with HBase, it is also necessary to add the <code>hbase.thrift.kerberos.principal</code> to the <code>_acl_</code> table. For example, to give the Thrift API principal, <code>thrift_server</code>, administrative access, a command such as this one will suffice:
<programlisting><![CDATA[
grant 'thrift_server', 'RWCA'
]]></programlisting> For more information about ACLs, please see the <link linkend='hbase.accesscontrol.configuration'>Access Control</link> section
</para>
<para>
The Thrift gateway will authenticate with HBase using the supplied
credential. No authentication will be performed by the Thrift gateway
itself. All client access via the Thrift gateway will use the Thrift
gateway's credential and have its privilege.
</para>
</section>
<section><title>Client-side Configuration for Secure Operation - REST Gateway</title>
<para>
Add the following to the <code>hbase-site.xml</code> file for every REST gateway:
<programlisting><![CDATA[
<property>
<name>hbase.rest.keytab.file</name>
<value>$KEYTAB</value>
</property>
<property>
<name>hbase.rest.kerberos.principal</name>
<value>$USER/_HOST@HADOOP.LOCALDOMAIN</value>
</property>
]]></programlisting>
</para>
<para>
Substitute the appropriate credential and keytab for $USER and $KEYTAB
respectively.
</para>
<para>
The REST gateway will authenticate with HBase using the supplied
credential. No authentication will be performed by the REST gateway
itself. All client access via the REST gateway will use the REST
gateway's credential and have its privilege.
</para>
<para>In order to use the REST API principal to interact with HBase, it is also necessary to add the <code>hbase.rest.kerberos.principal</code> to the <code>_acl_</code> table. For example, to give the REST API principal, <code>rest_server</code>, administrative access, a command such as this one will suffice:
<programlisting><![CDATA[
grant 'rest_server', 'RWCA'
]]></programlisting> For more information about ACLs, please see the <link linkend='hbase.accesscontrol.configuration'>Access Control</link> section
</para>
<para>
It should be possible for clients to authenticate with the HBase
cluster through the REST gateway in a pass-through manner via SPEGNO
HTTP authentication. This is future work.
</para>
</section>
</section> <!-- Secure Client Access to HBase -->
<section xml:id="hbase.secure.simpleconfiguration">
<title>Simple User Access to Apache HBase</title>
<para>Newer releases of Apache HBase (&gt;= 0.92) support optional SASL authentication of clients<footnote><para>See
also Matteo Bertozzi's article on <link xlink:href="http://www.cloudera.com/blog/2012/09/understanding-user-authentication-and-authorization-in-apache-hbase/">Understanding User Authentication and Authorization in Apache HBase</link>.</para></footnote>.</para>
<para>This describes how to set up Apache HBase and clients for simple user access to HBase resources.</para>
<section><title>Simple Versus Secure Access</title>
<para>
The following section shows how to set up simple user access. Simple user access is
not a secure method of operating HBase. This method is used to prevent users from making
mistakes. It can be used to mimic the Access Control using on a development system without having to
set up Kerberos.
</para>
<para>
This method is not used to prevent malicious or hacking attempts. To make HBase secure against these
types of attacks, you must configure HBase for secure operation. Refer to the section
<link linkend='hbase.accesscontrol.configuration'>Secure Client Access to HBase</link> and complete all of the steps described
there.
</para>
<section><title>Prerequisites</title>
<para>
None
</para>
<section><title>Server-side Configuration for Simple User Access Operation</title>
<para>
Add the following to the <code>hbase-site.xml</code> file on every server machine in the cluster:
</para>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
<property>
<name>hbase.security.authentication</name>
<value>simple</value>
</property>
<property>
<name>hbase.security.authorization</name>
<value>true</value>
</property>
<property>
<name>hbase.coprocessor.master.classes</name>
<value>org.apache.hadoop.hbase.security.access.AccessController</value>
</property>
<property>
<name>hbase.coprocessor.region.classes</name>
<value>org.apache.hadoop.hbase.security.access.AccessController</value>
</property>
]]></programlisting>
<para>
For 0.94, add the following to the <code>hbase-site.xml</code> file on every server machine in the cluster:
</para>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
<property>
<name>hbase.rpc.engine</name>
<value>org.apache.hadoop.hbase.ipc.SecureRpcEngine</value>
</property>
<property>
<name>hbase.coprocessor.master.classes</name>
<value>org.apache.hadoop.hbase.security.access.AccessController</value>
</property>
<property>
<name>hbase.coprocessor.region.classes</name>
<value>org.apache.hadoop.hbase.security.access.AccessController</value>
</property>
]]></programlisting>
<para>
A full shutdown and restart of HBase service is required when deploying
these configuration changes.
</para>
</section>
<section><title>Client-side Configuration for Simple User Access Operation</title>
<para>
Add the following to the <code>hbase-site.xml</code> file on every client:
</para>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
<property>
<name>hbase.security.authentication</name>
<value>simple</value>
</property>
]]></programlisting>
<para>
For 0.94, add the following to the <code>hbase-site.xml</code> file on every server machine in the cluster:
</para>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
<property>
<name>hbase.rpc.engine</name>
<value>org.apache.hadoop.hbase.ipc.SecureRpcEngine</value>
</property>
]]></programlisting>
<para>
Be advised that if the <code>hbase.security.authentication</code>
in the client- and server-side site files do not match, the client will
not be able to communicate with the cluster.
</para>
</section>
<section><title>Client-side Configuration for Simple User Access Operation - Thrift Gateway</title>
<para>The Thrift gateway user will need access. For example, to give the Thrift API user, <code>thrift_server</code>, administrative access, a command such as this one will suffice:
<programlisting><![CDATA[
grant 'thrift_server', 'RWCA'
]]></programlisting> For more information about ACLs, please see the <link linkend='hbase.accesscontrol.configuration'>Access Control</link> section
</para>
<para>
The Thrift gateway will authenticate with HBase using the supplied
credential. No authentication will be performed by the Thrift gateway
itself. All client access via the Thrift gateway will use the Thrift
gateway's credential and have its privilege.
</para>
</section>
<section><title>Client-side Configuration for Simple User Access Operation - REST Gateway</title>
<para>
The REST gateway will authenticate with HBase using the supplied
credential. No authentication will be performed by the REST gateway
itself. All client access via the REST gateway will use the REST
gateway's credential and have its privilege.
</para>
<para>The REST gateway user will need access. For example, to give the REST API user, <code>rest_server</code>, administrative access, a command such as this one will suffice:
<programlisting><![CDATA[
grant 'rest_server', 'RWCA'
]]></programlisting> For more information about ACLs, please see the <link linkend='hbase.accesscontrol.configuration'>Access Control</link> section
</para>
<para>
It should be possible for clients to authenticate with the HBase
cluster through the REST gateway in a pass-through manner via SPEGNO
HTTP authentication. This is future work.
</para>
</section>
</section>
</section>
</section> <!-- Simple User Access to Apache HBase -->
<section xml:id="hbase.tags">
<title>Tags</title>
<para>
Every cell can have metadata associated with it. Adding metadata in the data part of every cell would make things difficult.
</para>
<para>
The 0.98 version of HBase solves this problem by providing Tags along with the cell format.
Some of the usecases that uses the tags are Visibility labels, Cell level ACLs, etc.
</para>
<para>
HFile V3 version from 0.98 onwards supports tags and this feature can be turned on using the following configuration
</para>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
<property>
<name>hfile.format.version</name>
<value>3</value>
</property>
]]></programlisting>
<para>
Every cell can have zero or more tags. Every tag has a type and the actual tag byte array.
The types <command>0-31</command> are reserved for System tags. For example ‘1’ is reserved for ACL and ‘2’ is reserved for Visibility tags.
</para>
<para>
The way rowkeys, column families, qualifiers and values are encoded using different Encoding Algos, similarly the tags can also be encoded.
Tag encoding can be turned on per CF. Default is always turn ON.
To turn on the tag encoding on the HFiles use
</para>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
HColumnDescriptor#setCompressTags(boolean compressTags)
]]></programlisting>
<para>
Note that encoding of tags takes place only if the DataBlockEncoder is enabled for the CF.
</para>
<para>
As we compress the WAL entries using Dictionary the tags present in the WAL can also be compressed using Dictionary.
Every tag is compressed individually using WAL Dictionary. To turn ON tag compression in WAL dictionary enable the property
</para>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
<property>
<name>hbase.regionserver.wal.tags.enablecompression</name>
<value>true</value>
</property>
]]></programlisting>
<para>
To add tags to every cell during Puts, the following apis are provided
</para>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
Put#add(byte[] family, byte [] qualifier, byte [] value, Tag[] tag)
Put#add(byte[] family, byte[] qualifier, long ts, byte[] value, Tag[] tag)
]]></programlisting>
<para>
Some of the feature developed using tags are Cell level ACLs and Visibility labels.
These are some features that use tags framework and allows users to gain better security features on cell level.
</para>
<para>
For details checkout
</para>
<para>
<link linkend='hbase.accesscontrol.configuration'>Access Control</link>
<link linkend='hbase.visibility.labels'>Visibility labels</link>
</para>
</section>
<section xml:id="hbase.accesscontrol.configuration">
<title>Access Control</title>
<para>
Newer releases of Apache HBase (&gt;= 0.92) support optional access control
list (ACL-) based protection of resources on a column family and/or
table basis.
</para>
<para>
This describes how to set up Secure HBase for access control, with an
example of granting and revoking user permission on table resources
provided.
</para>
<section><title>Prerequisites</title>
<para>
You must configure HBase for secure or simple user access operation. Refer to the
<link linkend='hbase.accesscontrol.configuration'>Secure Client Access to HBase</link> or
<link linkend='hbase.accesscontrol.simpleconfiguration'>Simple User Access to HBase</link>
sections and complete all of the steps described
there.
</para>
<para>
For secure access, you must also configure ZooKeeper for secure operation. Changes to ACLs
are synchronized throughout the cluster using ZooKeeper. Secure
authentication to ZooKeeper must be enabled or otherwise it will be
possible to subvert HBase access control via direct client access to
ZooKeeper. Refer to the section on secure ZooKeeper configuration and
complete all of the steps described there.
</para>
</section>
<section><title>Overview</title>
<para>
With Secure RPC and Access Control enabled, client access to HBase is
authenticated and user data is private unless access has been
explicitly granted. Access to data can be granted at a table or per
column family basis.
</para>
<para>
However, the following items have been left out of the initial
implementation for simplicity:
</para>
<orderedlist>
<listitem>
<para>Row-level or per value (cell): Using Tags in HFile V3</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Push down of file ownership to HDFS: HBase is not designed for the case where files may have different permissions than the HBase system principal. Pushing file ownership down into HDFS would necessitate changes to core code. Also, while HDFS file ownership would make applying quotas easy, and possibly make bulk imports more straightforward, it is not clear that it would offer a more secure setup.</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>HBase managed "roles" as collections of permissions: We will not model "roles" internally in HBase to begin with. We instead allow group names to be granted permissions, which allows external modeling of roles via group membership. Groups are created and manipulated externally to HBase, via the Hadoop group mapping service.</para>
</listitem>
</orderedlist>
<para>
Access control mechanisms are mature and fairly standardized in the relational database world. The HBase implementation approximates current convention, but HBase has a simpler feature set than relational databases, especially in terms of client operations. We don't distinguish between an insert (new record) and update (of existing record), for example, as both collapse down into a Put. Accordingly, the important operations condense to four permissions: READ, WRITE, CREATE, and ADMIN.
</para>
<table>
<title>Operation To Permission Mapping</title>
<tgroup cols='2' align='left' colsep='1' rowsep='1'>
<colspec colname='c1' align='center'/>
<colspec colname='c2' align='left'/>
<thead>
<row>
<entry>Permission</entry>
<entry>Operation</entry>
</row>
</thead>
<tbody>
<!-- READ -->
<row>
<entry>Read</entry>
<entry>Get</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry></entry>
<entry>Exists</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry></entry>
<entry>Scan</entry>
</row>
<!-- WRITE -->
<row>
<entry>Write</entry>
<entry>Put</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry></entry>
<entry>Delete</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry></entry>
<entry>Lock/UnlockRow</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry></entry>
<entry>IncrementColumnValue</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry></entry>
<entry>CheckAndDelete/Put</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry></entry>
<entry>Flush</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry></entry>
<entry>Compact</entry>
</row>
<!-- CREATE -->
<row>
<entry>Create</entry>
<entry>Create</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry></entry>
<entry>Alter</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry></entry>
<entry>Drop</entry>
</row>
<!-- ADMIN -->
<row>
<entry>Admin</entry>
<entry>Enable/Disable</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry></entry>
<entry>Snapshot/Restore/Clone</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry></entry>
<entry>Split</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry></entry>
<entry>Major Compact</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry></entry>
<entry>Grant</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry></entry>
<entry>Revoke</entry>
</row>
<row>
<entry></entry>
<entry>Shutdown</entry>
</row>
</tbody>
</tgroup>
</table>
<para>
Permissions can be granted in any of the following scopes, though
CREATE and ADMIN permissions are effective only at table scope.
</para>
<para>
<itemizedlist>
<listitem>
<para>Table</para>
<para>
<itemizedlist>
<listitem><para>Read: User can read from any column family in table</para></listitem>
<listitem><para>Write: User can write to any column family in table</para></listitem>
<listitem><para>Create: User can alter table attributes; add, alter, or drop column families; and drop the table.</para></listitem>
<listitem><para>Admin: User can alter table attributes; add, alter, or drop column families; and enable, disable, or drop the table. User can also trigger region (re)assignments or relocation.</para></listitem>
</itemizedlist>
</para>
</listitem>
<listitem>
<para>Column Family</para>
<para>
<itemizedlist>
<listitem><para>Read: User can read from the column family</para></listitem>
<listitem><para>Write: User can write to the column family</para></listitem>
</itemizedlist>
</para>
</listitem>
</itemizedlist>
</para>
<para>
There is also an implicit global scope for the superuser.
</para>
<para>
The superuser is a principal, specified in the HBase site configuration
file, that has equivalent access to HBase as the 'root' user would on a
UNIX derived system. Normally this is the principal that the HBase
processes themselves authenticate as. Although future versions of HBase
Access Control may support multiple superusers, the superuser privilege
will always include the principal used to run the HMaster process. Only
the superuser is allowed to create tables, switch the balancer on or
off, or take other actions with global consequence. Furthermore, the
superuser has an implicit grant of all permissions to all resources.
</para>
<para>
Tables have a new metadata attribute: OWNER, the user principal who owns
the table. By default this will be set to the user principal who creates
the table, though it may be changed at table creation time or during an
alter operation by setting or changing the OWNER table attribute. Only a
single user principal can own a table at a given time. A table owner will
have all permissions over a given table.
</para>
</section>
<section><title>Server-side Configuration for Access Control</title>
<para>
Enable the AccessController coprocessor in the cluster configuration
and restart HBase. The restart can be a rolling one. Complete the
restart of all Master and RegionServer processes before setting up
ACLs.
</para>
<para>
To enable the AccessController, modify the <code>hbase-site.xml</code> file on every server machine in the cluster to look like:
</para>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
<property>
<name>hbase.coprocessor.master.classes</name>
<value>org.apache.hadoop.hbase.security.access.AccessController</value>
</property>
<property>
<name>hbase.coprocessor.region.classes</name>
<value>org.apache.hadoop.hbase.security.token.TokenProvider,
org.apache.hadoop.hbase.security.access.AccessController</value>
</property>
]]></programlisting>
</section>
<section>
<title>Cell level Access Control using Tags</title>
<para>
Prior to HBase 0.98 access control was restricted to table and column family level. Thanks to tags feature in 0.98 that allows Access control on a cell level.
The existing Access Controller coprocessor helps in achieving cell level access control also.
For details on configuring it refer to <link linkend='hbase.accesscontrol.configuration'>Access Control</link> section.
</para>
<para>
The ACLs can be specified for every mutation using the APIs
</para>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
Mutation.setACL(String user, Permission perms)
Mutation.setACL(Map<String, Permission> perms)
]]></programlisting>
<para>
For example, to provide read permission to an user ‘user1’ then
</para>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
put.setACL(“user1”, new Permission(Permission.Action.READ))
]]></programlisting>
<para>
Generally the ACL applied on the table and CF takes precedence over Cell level ACL. In order to make the cell level ACL to take precedence use the following API,
</para>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
Mutation.setACLStrategy(boolean cellFirstStrategy)
]]></programlisting>
<para>
Please note that inorder to use this feature, HFile V3 version should be turned on.
</para>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
<property>
<name>hfile.format.version</name>
<value>3</value>
</property>
]]></programlisting>
<para>
Note that deletes with ACLs do not have any effect.
To keep things simple the ACLs applied on the current Put does not change the ACL of any previous Put in the sense
that the ACL on the current put does not affect older versions of Put for the same row.
</para>
</section>
<section><title>Shell Enhancements for Access Control</title>
<para>
The HBase shell has been extended to provide simple commands for editing and updating user permissions. The following commands have been added for access control list management:
</para>
Grant
<para>
<programlisting>
grant &lt;user|@group&gt; &lt;permissions&gt; [ &lt;table&gt; [ &lt;column family&gt; [ &lt;column qualifier&gt; ] ] ]
</programlisting>
</para>
<para>
<code class="code">&lt;user|@group&gt;</code> is user or group (start with character '@'), Groups are created and manipulated via the Hadoop group mapping service.
</para>
<para>
<code>&lt;permissions&gt;</code> is zero or more letters from the set "RWCA": READ('R'), WRITE('W'), CREATE('C'), ADMIN('A').
</para>
<para>
Note: Grants and revocations of individual permissions on a resource are both accomplished using the <code>grant</code> command. A separate <code>revoke</code> command is also provided by the shell, but this is for fast revocation of all of a user's access rights to a given resource only.
</para>
<para>
Revoke
</para>
<para>
<programlisting>
revoke &lt;user|@group&gt; [ &lt;table&gt; [ &lt;column family&gt; [ &lt;column qualifier&gt; ] ] ]
</programlisting>
</para>
<para>
Alter
</para>
<para>
The <code>alter</code> command has been extended to allow ownership assignment:
<programlisting>
alter 'tablename', {OWNER => 'username|@group'}
</programlisting>
</para>
<para>
User Permission
</para>
<para>
The <code>user_permission</code> command shows all access permissions for the current user for a given table:
<programlisting>
user_permission &lt;table&gt;
</programlisting>
</para>
</section>
</section> <!-- Access Control -->
<section xml:id="hbase.secure.bulkload">
<title>Secure Bulk Load</title>
<para>
Bulk loading in secure mode is a bit more involved than normal setup, since the client has to transfer the ownership of the files generated from the mapreduce job to HBase. Secure bulk loading is implemented by a coprocessor, named <link xlink:href="http://hbase.apache.org/apidocs/org/apache/hadoop/hbase/security/access/SecureBulkLoadEndpoint.html">SecureBulkLoadEndpoint</link>. SecureBulkLoadEndpoint uses a staging directory <code>"hbase.bulkload.staging.dir"</code>, which defaults to <code>/tmp/hbase-staging/</code>. The algorithm is as follows.
<itemizedlist>
<listitem>Create an hbase owned staging directory which is world traversable (<code>-rwx--x--x, 711</code>) <code>/tmp/hbase-staging</code>. </listitem>
<listitem>A user writes out data to his secure output directory: /user/foo/data </listitem>
<listitem>A call is made to hbase to create a secret staging directory
which is globally readable/writable (<code>-rwxrwxrwx, 777</code>): /tmp/hbase-staging/averylongandrandomdirectoryname</listitem>
<listitem>The user makes the data world readable and writable, then moves it
into the random staging directory, then calls bulkLoadHFiles()</listitem>
</itemizedlist>
</para>
<para>
Like delegation tokens the strength of the security lies in the length
and randomness of the secret directory.
</para>
<para>
You have to enable the secure bulk load to work properly. You can modify the <code>hbase-site.xml</code> file on every server machine in the cluster and add the SecureBulkLoadEndpoint class to the list of regionserver coprocessors:
</para>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
<property>
<name>hbase.bulkload.staging.dir</name>
<value>/tmp/hbase-staging</value>
</property>
<property>
<name>hbase.coprocessor.region.classes</name>
<value>org.apache.hadoop.hbase.security.token.TokenProvider,
org.apache.hadoop.hbase.security.access.AccessController,org.apache.hadoop.hbase.security.access.SecureBulkLoadEndpoint</value>
</property>
]]></programlisting>
</section> <!-- Secure Bulk Load -->
<section xml:id="hbase.visibility.labels">
<title>Visibility Labels</title>
<para>
This feature provides cell level security with labeled visibility for the cells. Cells can be associated with a visibility expression. The visibility expression can contain labels joined with logical expressions &#39;&amp;&#39;, &#39;|&#39; and &#39;!&#39;. Also using &#39;(&#39;, &#39;)&#39; one can specify the precedence order. For example, consider the label set { confidential, secret, topsecret, probationary }, where the first three are sensitivity classifications and the last describes if an employee is probationary or not. If a cell is stored with this visibility expression:
( secret | topsecret ) &amp; !probationary
</para>
<para>
Then any user associated with the secret or topsecret label will be able to view the cell, as long as the user is not also associated with the probationary label. Furthermore, any user only associated with the confidential label, whether probationary or not, will not see the cell or even know of its existence.
</para>
<para>
Visibility expressions like the above can be added when storing or mutating a cell using the API,
</para>
<para><code>Mutation#setCellVisibility(new CellVisibility(String labelExpession));</code></para>
Where the labelExpression could be &#39;( secret | topsecret ) &amp; !probationary&#39;
<para>
We build the user&#39;s label set in the RPC context when a request is first received by the HBase RegionServer. How users are associated with labels is pluggable. The default plugin passes through labels specified in Authorizations added to the Get or Scan and checks those against the calling user&#39;s authenticated labels list. When client passes some labels for which the user is not authenticated, this default algorithm will drop those. One can pass a subset of user authenticated labels via the Scan/Get authorizations.
</para>
<para><code>Get#setAuthorizations(new Authorizations(String,...));</code></para>
<para><code>Scan#setAuthorizations(new Authorizations(String,...));</code></para>
<section xml:id="hbase.visibility.label.administration">
<title>Visibility Label Administration</title>
<para>
There are new client side Java APIs and shell commands for performing visibility labels administrative actions. Only the HBase super user is authorized to perform these operations.
</para>
<section xml:id="hbase.visibility.label.administration.add.label">
<title>Adding Labels</title>
<para>A set of labels can be added to the system either by using the Java API</para>
<para><code>VisibilityClient#addLabels(Configuration conf, final String[] labels)</code></para>
<para>Or by using the shell command</para>
<para><code>add_labels [label1, label2]</code></para>
<para>
Valid label can include alphanumeric characters and characters &#39;-&#39;, &#39;_&#39;, &#39;:&#39;, &#39;.&#39; and &#39;/&#39;
</para>
</section>
<section xml:id="hbase.visibility.label.administration.add.label">
<title>User Label Association</title>
<para>A set of labels can be associated with a user by using the API</para>
<para><code>VisibilityClient#setAuths(Configuration conf, final String[] auths, final String user)</code></para>
<para>Or by using the shell command</para>
<para><code>set_auths user,[label1, label2].</code></para>
<para>Labels can be disassociated from a user using API</para>
<para><code>VisibilityClient#clearAuths(Configuration conf, final String[] auths, final String user)</code></para>
<para>Or by using shell command</para>
<para><code>clear_auths user,[label1, label2]</code></para>
<para>
One can use the API <code>VisibilityClient#getAuths(Configuration conf, final String user)</code> or <code>get_auths</code> shell command to get the list of labels associated for a given user. The labels and user auths information will be stored in the system table &#34;labels&#34;.
</para>
</section>
</section>
<section xml:id="hbase.visibility.label.configuration">
<title>Server Side Configuration</title>
<para>
HBase stores cell level labels as cell tags. HFile version 3 adds the cell tags support. Be sure to use HFile version 3 by setting this property in every server site configuration file:
</para>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
<property>
<name>hfile.format.version</name>
<value>3</value>
</property>
]]></programlisting>
<para>
You will also need to make sure the VisibilityController coprocessor is active on every table to protect by adding it to the list of system coprocessors in the server site configuration files:
</para>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
<property>
<name>hbase.coprocessor.master.classes</name>
<value>org.apache.hadoop.hbase.security.visibility.VisibilityController</value>
</property>
<property>
<name>hbase.coprocessor.region.classes</name>
<value>org.apache.hadoop.hbase.security.visibility.VisibilityController</value>
</property>
]]></programlisting>
<para>
As said above, finding out labels authenticated for a given get/scan request is a pluggable algorithm. A custom implementation can be plugged in using the property <code>hbase.regionserver.scan.visibility.label.generator.class</code>. The default implementation class is <code>org.apache.hadoop.hbase.security.visibility.DefaultScanLabelGenerator</code>
</para>
</section>
</section>
<section xml:id="hbase.encryption.server">
<title>Transparent Server Side Encryption</title>
<para>
This feature provides transparent encryption for protecting HFile and WAL data at rest, using a two-tier key architecture for flexible and non-intrusive key rotation.
</para>
<para>
First, the administrator provisions a cluster master key, stored into a key provider accessable to every trusted HBase process: the Master, the RegionServers, and clients (e.g. the shell) on administrative workstations. The default key provider integrates with the Java KeyStore API and any key management system with support for it. How HBase retrieves key material is configurable via the site file. The master key may be stored on the cluster servers, protected by a secure KeyStore file, or on an external keyserver, or in a hardware security module. This master key is resolved as needed by HBase processes through the configured key provider.
</para>
<para>
Then, encryption keys can be specified in schema on a per column family basis, by creating or modifying a column descriptor to include two additional attributes: the name of the encryption algorithm to use (currently only "AES" is supported), and, optionally, a data key wrapped (encrypted) with the cluster master key. Per CF keys facilitates low impact incremental key rotation and reduces the scope of any external leak of key material. The wrapped data key is stored in the CF schema metadata, and in each HFile for the CF, encrypted with the cluster master key. Once the CF is configured for encryption, any new HFiles will be written encrypted. To insure encryption of all HFiles, trigger a major compaction after first enabling this feature. The key for decryption, encrypted with the cluster master key, is stored in the HFiles in a new meta block. At file open time the data key will be extracted from the HFile, decrypted with the cluster master key, and used for decryption of the remainder of the HFile. The HFile will be unreadable if the master key is not available. Should remote users somehow acquire access to the HFile data because of some lapse in HDFS permissions or from inappropriately discarded media, there will be no means to decrypt either the data key or the file data.
</para>
<para>
Specifying a data key in the CF schema is optional. If one is not present, a random data key will be created for each HFile.
</para>
<para>
A new configuration option for encrypting the WAL is also introduced. Even though WALs are transient, it is necessary to encrypt the WALEdits to avoid circumventing HFile protections for encrypted column families.
</para>
<section xml:id="hbase.encryption.server.configuration">
<title>Configuration</title>
<para>
Create a secret key of appropriate length for AES.
</para>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
$ keytool -keystore /path/to/hbase/conf/hbase.jks \
-storetype jceks -storepass <password> \
-genseckey -keyalg AES -keysize 128 \
-alias <alias>
]]></programlisting>
<para>
where &lt;password&gt; is the password for the KeyStore file and &lt;alias&gt;is the user name of the HBase service account, typically "hbase". Simply press RETURN to store the key with the same password as the store. The resulting file should be distributed to all nodes running HBase daemons, with file ownership and permissions set to be readable only by the HBase service account.
</para>
<para>
Configure HBase daemons to use a key provider backed by the KeyStore files for retrieving the cluster master key as needed.
</para>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
<property>
<name>hbase.crypto.keyprovider</name>
<value>org.apache.hadoop.hbase.io.crypto.KeyStoreKeyProvider</value>
</property>
<property>
<name>hbase.crypto.keyprovider.parameters</name>
<value>jceks:///path/to/hbase/conf/hbase.jks?password=<password></value>
</property>
]]></programlisting>
<para>
By default the HBase service account name will be used to resolve the cluster master key, but you can store it with any arbitrary alias and configure HBase appropriately:
</para>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
<property>
<name>hbase.crypto.master.key.name</name>
<value>hbase</value>
</property>
]]></programlisting>
<para>
Because the password to the key store is sensitive information, the HBase site XML file should also have its permissions set to be readable only by the HBase service account.
</para>
<para>
Transparent encryption is a feature of HFile version 3. Be sure to use HFile version 3 by setting this property in every server site configuration file:
</para>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
<property>
<name>hfile.format.version</name>
<value>3</value>
</property>
]]></programlisting>
<para>
Finally, configure the secure WAL in every server site configuration file:
</para>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
<property>
<name>hbase.regionserver.hlog.reader.impl</name>
<value>org.apache.hadoop.hbase.regionserver.wal.SecureProtobufLogReader</value>
</property>
<property>
<name>hbase.regionserver.hlog.writer.impl</name>
<value>org.apache.hadoop.hbase.regionserver.wal.SecureProtobufLogWriter</value>
</property>
<property>
<name>hbase.regionserver.wal.encryption</name>
<value>true</value>
</property>
]]></programlisting>
</section>
<section xml:id="hbase.encryption.server.schema">
<title>Setting Encryption on a CF</title>
<para>
To enable encryption on a CF, use <code>HBaseAdmin#modifyColumn</code> or the HBase shell to modify the column descriptor. The attribute 'ENCRYPTION' specifies the encryption algorithm to use. Currently only "AES" is supported. If creating a new table, simply set this attribute; no subsequent table modification will be necessary.
</para>
<para>
If setting a specific data key, the attribute 'ENCRYPTION_KEY' should contain the data key wrapped by the cluster master key. The static methods <code>wrapKey</code> and <code>unwrapKey</code> in <code>org.apache.hadoop.hbase.security.EncryptionUtil</code> can be used in conjunction with <code>HColumnDescriptor#setEncryptionKey</code> for this purpose. Because this must be done programatically, setting a data key with the shell is not supported.
</para>
<para>
To disable encryption on a CF, simply remove the 'ENCRYPTION' (and 'ENCRYPTION_KEY', if it was set) attributes from the column schema, using <code>HBaseAdmin#modifyColumn</code> or the HBase shell. All new HFiles for the CF will be written without encryption. Trigger a major compaction to rewrite all files.
</para>
</section>
<section xml:id="hbase.encryption.server.data_key_rotation">
<title>Data Key Rotation</title>
<para>
Data key rotation is made simple by this design. First, change the CF key in the column descriptor. Then, trigger major compaction. Once compaction has completed, all files will be (re)encrypted with the new key material. While this process is ongoing, HFiles encrypted with old key material will still be readable.
</para>
</section>
<section xml:id="hbase.encryption.server.master_key_rotation">
<title>Master Key Rotation</title>
<para>
Master key rotation can be achieved by updating the KeyStore to contain a new master key, as described above, with also the old master key added to the KeyStore under a different alias. Then, configure fallback to the old master key in the HBase site file:
</para>
<programlisting><![CDATA[
<property>
<name>hbase.crypto.master.alternate.key.name</name>
<value>hbase.old</value>
</property>
]]></programlisting>
<para>
This will require a rolling restart of the HBase daemons to take effect. As with data key rotation, trigger a major compaction and wait for it to complete. Once compaction has completed, all files will be (re)encrypted with data keys wrapped by the new cluster master key. The old master key, and its associated site file configuration, can then be removed, and all trace of the old master key will be gone after the next rolling restart. A second rolling restart is not immediately necessary.
</para>
</section>
</section>
</chapter>