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// This module is included in the following assemblies:
//
// router-deployment-guidelines.adoc
[id='security-guidelines-{context}']
= Security guidelines
In the router network, the interior routers should be secured with a strong authentication mechanism in which they identify themselves to each other. You should choose and plan this authentication mechanism before creating the router network.
[WARNING]
====
If the interior routers are not properly secured, unauthorized routers (or endpoints pretending to be routers) could join the router network, compromising its integrity and availability.
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You can choose a security mechanism that best fits your requirements. However, you should consider the following recommendations:
* Create an X.509 Certificate Authority (CA) to oversee the interior portion of the router network.
* Generate an individual certificate for each interior router.
+
Each interior router can be configured to use the CA to authenticate connections from any other interior routers.
+
[NOTE]
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Connections from edge routers and clients can use different levels of security, depending on your requirements.
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By using these recommendations, a new interior router cannot join the network until the owner of the CA issues a new certificate for the new router. In addition, an intruder wishing to spoof an interior router cannot do so because it would not have a valid X.509 certificate issued by the network's CA.