| China’s Threat to Russia Last week , Russia and China held joint military maneuvers in the presence of both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Hu Jintao . But a new strategic alliance between the two countries is not likely , as it is China that poses the greatest strategic threat to Russia , although many in the Kremlin seem blind to this as they rattle sabers at America and the West . Indeed , China officially considers several regions in Russia’s Far East to be only “ alienated ” from it . China’s territorial claims on Russia are often noted in Chinese grade school geography textbooks , which include a number of Russian Far Eastern regions within China’s borders . This is consistent with the Chinese strategic concept of “ vital space , ” which includes all spheres of a state’s strategic activities , on land , at sea , under water , in the air , and in space . The dimensions of “ vital space ” are determined by a country’s economic , scientific , technical , social , and military capabilities – in essence , its “ total power . ” According to Chinese theorists , the “ vital space ” of great powers extends far beyond a state’s borders , whereas the “ vital space ” of weak countries is limited to strategic boundaries that do not always correspond to the borders of their national territory . Today , China has territorial claims against 11 of its 24 neighbors , including India , Japan , Vietnam , and the Philippines , in addition to Russia . In China’s relations with all of them , the potential use of military force was and remains an important factor . In September 2006 , China’s People’s Liberation Army ( PLA ) conducted an unprecedentedly large 10-day exercise , involving the Shenyang and Beijing military districts , the two most powerful of China’s seven military districts . Shenyang abuts the Russian Armed Forces ’ Far Eastern District , and the Beijing district shares a border with Russia’s Siberian Military District . During the exercises , Shenyang units advanced 1,000 kilometers into the Beijing district , where they engaged in joint war games . To military observers , the Beijing/Shenyang exercises seemed to be practice for a possible offensive operation against Russia , because exercises on such a scale are undertaken only at the final stage of a multi-year program to train troops to enact specific strategic and operational plans . The geography of the exercises , and the offensive nature of the tasks undertaken , leaves little doubt that Russia was cast in the role of “ potential adversary . ” Such a show of force is an ancient , traditional Chinese political technique . Paradoxically , these exercises were undertaken during a period when bilateral political and economic ties appeared on the surface to be at their highest point . Russia has an important place in Chinese geopolitical calculations , as a supplier of both modern weaponry and energy resources needed to continue its modernization . Therefore , the Chinese are doing everything possible to strengthen their economic and political position in Russia , and to draw Russia into their sphere of influence . And China is succeeding , most importantly by consistently reinforcing Putin’s anti-American and anti-Western agenda . While Beijing/Shenyang exercise should have indicated to Russian leaders that China’s intentions toward Russia may not always be benign , Russia’s political and military leadership seem not to sense any threat ; on the contrary , they continue to sell the Chinese advanced weapons . Russia’s current diplomatic tilt , indeed , is clearly against its own long-term national security interests . China will never be interested in Russia’s economic and political modernization , for it prefers Russia to remain a source of mineral and energy resources and a vast “ strategic rear ” in its looming challenge with the United States . Likewise , the Shanghai Cooperation Organization ( SCO ) , which just concluded its annual meeting , is in China’s eyes a tool of regional policy that helps strengthen China’s influence and control over Central Asia’s natural resources at the expense of Russia . No nation threatens China’s land borders . China can solve its domestic problems , such as separatism , by itself . China is militarily self-sufficient and needs military cooperation under the SCO framework only in order to free its hands if any conflict should arise that affects its interests . In fact , conflict between Russia and China is possible precisely in Central Asia , given the clear differences in the two countries ’ economic and political interests in that region . Aside from control of the region’s energy supplies , water has become a potential source of conflict , given China’s serious shortages . Yet , while the Chinese clearly understand these contingencies and are preparing themselves to deal with them diplomatically and militarily , the Kremlin remains myopically obsessed with the phantom threat of America . Thus , as the Kremlin dreams of re-establishing its domination over what Russians refer to as the “ near abroad ” ( Ukraine , Belarus , the Baltic countries , and the other post-Soviet states ) , China is increasingly looking at Russia as its own “ near abroad . ” Will the Kremlin finally wake up to this ? Thirty-six years ago , Richard Nixon and Mao Zedong turned world politics upside down , as both America and China realized that it was the Soviet Union , and not each other , that posed the greater threat . Vladimir Putin needs his own “ Nixon moment . ” Alienating the West is a foolish strategy when the greatest long term threat to Russia comes from the East . |