| China and Russia in the New World Disorder Can Kosovo achieve independence without the tacit consent of Russia , and can there be a humanitarian and political solution to the tragedy in Darfur without the active goodwill of China ? The two crises have nothing in common , but their resolution will depend in large part on whether these two permanent members of the United Nations Security Council use their veto power . Comparing the respective abilities of Russia and China to block key international initiatives makes no sense in itself , but it does constitute a useful tool for understanding the transformation of the international system that is now taking place as a direct consequence of the relative decline of America’s global power . From that standpoint , the deepening of chaos in the Middle East poses both opportunities and risks for Russia and China , which may force them to define the roles they want to play and the images they want to project in the world . The key question is this : Is Russia taking giant steps in the “ wrong direction ” while China is taking “ minuscule ” steps in the “ right direction ” ? Superficially , Russia and China may give the impression that they are pursuing the same path when they both proclaim with pride that they are “ back ” on the world stage . But this boast means different things for each country . For China , a deeply self-confident country , to be “ back ” simply means regaining the country’s historical centrality in the world after an absence of more than two centuries . After all , at the end of the eighteenth century , China became the world’s first producer of manufactured goods , and it perceives itself as a center of civilization unequalled by any other in Asia , if not the world . China’s renewed self-confidence is based on its remarkable economic prowess , which is derived not from natural resources , but from productivity and creativity . Whatever the huge political , social , and economic tensions may exist , there is a “ feel good ” factor in China , a sense of progress , with the 2008 Olympics in Beijing figuring as the symbolic moment that will proclaim to the world the scale of the country’s achievements . Above all , with the exception of the Taiwan issue , China is a satisfied status quo power when it comes to the evolution of the international system – a patient actor that finds it perfectly legitimate to behave and to be seen as the world’s number two power . By contrast , the Russians remain insecure about their status in the world . Russia’s explosive “ revisionist ” behavior on the eve of the recent G8 summit is an indication of the Kremlin’s “ unsatisfied ” nature . Because they know they are less potent , particularly in demographic and economic terms , Russians feel they have to do “ more . ” For them , to say “ Russia is back ” means that the humiliating Yeltsin years are over , and that they now must be treated as equals , particularly by the United States . Russians are nostalgic not for the Cold War as such , but for the international status they lost when it ended . Now that America is no longer a “ hyperpower ” with no strategic challengers , Russia has reasserted its status as a “ superpower , ” a claim that is not necessarily supported by reality . Unlike the Chinese , the Russians do not create economic wealth , but merely exploit their energy and mineral resources . Moreover , unlike the Chinese , they have not always been confident of their position in the world . Torn between Europe and Asia in cultural and political terms , victimized by a dark , narcissistic instinct that pervades their reading of their past and their visions of the future , it should surprise no one that Russia is now behaving like a “ revisionist ” power . Unsatisfied with their inner identity , it is only natural that Russians should demand changes that make them feel more secure and proud . Less than 20 years ago , the Czech Republic and Poland were part of their sphere of influence , so Russians understandably cannot accept the US unilaterally implanting its security system there . Of course , in their respective judgments on Russia and China , the West – and Europeans in particular – may be demonstrating selective emotions . “ We ” tend to be less demanding of China than of Russia , because we tend to see Russia as “ European ” ( at least culturally ) . As a result , the culture of physical violence and verbal provocation that is gaining ground in Putin’s Russia is deeply disturbing , whereas we tend to judge Chinese misdeeds with a greater sense of distance , if not indifference . But the differences between Russia and China today may prove to be less significant tomorrow if the deterioration in the Middle East imposes a sense of collective responsibility on all five permanent members of the UN Security Council . It is one thing for Russia and China to exploit America’s growing difficulties from Gaza to Kabul ; but it is quite another if the situation deteriorates to the point of general destabilization in the region . Indeed , the Middle East’s deepening problems may impose a sense of restraint in Russia and China by forcing them to calculate not in terms of their global “ nuisance value ” vis-à-vis the West , but in terms of their ability to make a positive and stabilizing contribution to the world order . |