| France’s Fourth Moment KYIV – Since World War II’s end , France has consistently risen to the challenge of restructuring Europe in times of crisis . In doing so , France became the catalyst not only for building European unity , but also for creating the prosperity that marked Europe’s post-war decades – a prosperity now under threat because of the global financial and economic crisis . If we are to see a stronger Europe emerge from today’s challenges , visionary French leadership is needed again . The first moment when decisive French leadership began to unify Europe came when Robert Schuman and Konrad Adenauer created the European Coal and Steel Community . By rooting the then West Germany in the political , economic , and social fabric of the West , that step heralded the start of Germany’s rebirth and economic miracle . The second time that France consolidated Europe’s internal architecture came in 1983 , during the debates over the stationing of American cruise and Pershing missiles in Germany to counter the deployment of SS20 missiles by the Soviet Union . France’s resolve to stand with Germany helped prevent Germany from drifting into a dangerous neutrality that would have shaken the European community to its core . The third moment came after the Berlin Wall fell , and it was feared that an enlarged Germany might destabilize Europe . After initially trying to delay reunification , France embraced it , in exchange for Germany’s reaffirming its commitment to European unity and Franco-German leadership of the European community . As a result , Germany bound itself to the idea of “ ever closer union ” even more definitively by pledging to join the common European currency , the euro . It is now urgent that the insights that have animated Franco-German relations be applied to all of Central and Eastern Europe . Only by securing the European identity of this entire region , and by anchoring the growing Russo-German relationship in a European context , can the European Union continue on its path of stability and prosperity . Only by reinforcing open trading and financial relations across Europe can we hope to subdue today’s crisis . For it is in no European country’s interest , or in the interest of the EU as a whole , that Central and Eastern Europe feel that they have been cast adrift or that Germany and Russia fixate on each other in this time of crisis . As with Germany in the 1950’s , the nature of Russia’s links with its immediate neighbors is turning out to be the defining factor in shaping the country’s international image . Many observers regard these relations as a signal not just to the region , but to the rest of the world , of the sort of power that Russia wishes to be . The issue is partly one of “ internationalism ” itself . In contrast to Europe – with its close-knit network of multilateral organizations through which states formulate and conduct much of their foreign policies – Russia is not accustomed to intensively cooperative international procedures . But keeping Russia at arm’s length from Europe has only strengthened the sense of isolation that many Russians feel , tempting them to define the country’s interests in ways that are irreconcilable with those of Europe . It has also heightened Russia’s desire to construct a special , bilateral Russo-German relationship heedless of the context of the EU . European history during the past 60 years makes clear that the most promising approach to meeting the challenge of national reconciliation and stability is not to focus on specific contingencies , but to establish procedures that encourage orderly change . A singular vision has always animated this process : animosity between neighbors must not be allowed to fester , and the rule of law must reign not just within countries , but also between them . To believe that such a vision can work for Russia , Ukraine , and Europe is not wishful thinking , but rests on the successful experience of France and Germany in promoting amity . Indeed , the existence or absence of a framework of cooperation often determines whether a dispute mutates into a crisis . Such cooperative frameworks seek to reconcile national independence with regional interdependence , focusing political leaders ’ minds on prosperity for their people rather than on gaining unilateral advantages that ultimately impoverish and unsettle everyone . The first lesson of European unity is that times of crisis must draw the continent closer together , not divide it through protectionism , competitive devaluations , and expulsions of immigrants . Similarly , the euro must not be allowed to become an Iron Curtain that consigns non-members to a high-risk zone where investors dare not venture . For Ukraine , Europe can help by embracing the free-trade agreement that we are now negotiating . Coupled with our successful membership in the World Trade Organization , Ukraine would stand to benefit when world and European trade begins to recover . Europe can also consider using various stabilization funds to help our economy through the crisis that we are all enduring . I do not ask for these things out of a narrow concern for my country’s health . Just as the US Federal Reserve has engaged in credit and currency swaps with Brazil , Mexico , Singapore , and South Korea and other countries to ease their access to the dollars they need , the European Central Bank must offer such swap arrangements to Europe’s non-euro countries in order for trade and production processes to continue . Yes , these are dark times , and all politicians want to protect their voters . But Europe’s greatest postwar leaders understood that keeping the wider view of Europe in mind is the best way to achieve this goal . As at so many times before , now – with all of our economies in peril – is a moment for decisive French leadership . |