| /* Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more |
| * contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with |
| * this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. |
| * The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0 |
| * (the "License"); you may not use this file except in compliance with |
| * the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at |
| * |
| * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 |
| * |
| * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software |
| * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, |
| * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. |
| * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and |
| * limitations under the License. |
| */ |
| |
| /* _ _ |
| * _ __ ___ ___ __| | ___ ___| | mod_ssl |
| * | '_ ` _ \ / _ \ / _` | / __/ __| | Apache Interface to OpenSSL |
| * | | | | | | (_) | (_| | \__ \__ \ | |
| * |_| |_| |_|\___/ \__,_|___|___/___/_| |
| * |_____| |
| * ssl_engine_kernel.c |
| * The SSL engine kernel |
| */ |
| /* ``It took me fifteen years to discover |
| I had no talent for programming, but |
| I couldn't give it up because by that |
| time I was too famous.'' |
| -- Unknown */ |
| #include "ssl_private.h" |
| |
| static void ssl_configure_env(request_rec *r, SSLConnRec *sslconn); |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| static int ssl_find_vhost(void *servername, conn_rec *c, server_rec *s); |
| #endif |
| |
| /* Perform a speculative (and non-blocking) read from the connection |
| * filters for the given request, to determine whether there is any |
| * pending data to read. Return non-zero if there is, else zero. */ |
| static int has_buffered_data(request_rec *r) |
| { |
| apr_bucket_brigade *bb; |
| apr_off_t len; |
| apr_status_t rv; |
| int result; |
| |
| bb = apr_brigade_create(r->pool, r->connection->bucket_alloc); |
| |
| rv = ap_get_brigade(r->connection->input_filters, bb, AP_MODE_SPECULATIVE, |
| APR_NONBLOCK_READ, 1); |
| result = rv == APR_SUCCESS |
| && apr_brigade_length(bb, 1, &len) == APR_SUCCESS |
| && len > 0; |
| |
| apr_brigade_destroy(bb); |
| |
| return result; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Post Read Request Handler |
| */ |
| int ssl_hook_ReadReq(request_rec *r) |
| { |
| SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection); |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| const char *servername; |
| #endif |
| SSL *ssl; |
| |
| if (!sslconn) { |
| return DECLINED; |
| } |
| |
| if (sslconn->non_ssl_request) { |
| const char *errmsg; |
| char *thisurl; |
| char *thisport = ""; |
| int port = ap_get_server_port(r); |
| |
| if (!ap_is_default_port(port, r)) { |
| thisport = apr_psprintf(r->pool, ":%u", port); |
| } |
| |
| thisurl = ap_escape_html(r->pool, |
| apr_psprintf(r->pool, "https://%s%s/", |
| ap_get_server_name(r), |
| thisport)); |
| |
| errmsg = apr_psprintf(r->pool, |
| "Reason: You're speaking plain HTTP " |
| "to an SSL-enabled server port.<br />\n" |
| "Instead use the HTTPS scheme to access " |
| "this URL, please.<br />\n" |
| "<blockquote>Hint: " |
| "<a href=\"%s\"><b>%s</b></a></blockquote>", |
| thisurl, thisurl); |
| |
| apr_table_setn(r->notes, "error-notes", errmsg); |
| |
| /* Now that we have caught this error, forget it. we are done |
| * with using SSL on this request. |
| */ |
| sslconn->non_ssl_request = 0; |
| |
| |
| return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Get the SSL connection structure and perform the |
| * delayed interlinking from SSL back to request_rec |
| */ |
| ssl = sslconn->ssl; |
| if (!ssl) { |
| return DECLINED; |
| } |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| if ((servername = SSL_get_servername(ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name))) { |
| char *host, *scope_id; |
| apr_port_t port; |
| apr_status_t rv; |
| |
| /* |
| * The SNI extension supplied a hostname. So don't accept requests |
| * with either no hostname or a different hostname. |
| */ |
| if (!r->hostname) { |
| ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server, |
| "Hostname %s provided via SNI, but no hostname" |
| " provided in HTTP request", servername); |
| return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST; |
| } |
| rv = apr_parse_addr_port(&host, &scope_id, &port, r->hostname, r->pool); |
| if (rv != APR_SUCCESS || scope_id) { |
| return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST; |
| } |
| if (strcmp(host, servername)) { |
| ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server, |
| "Hostname %s provided via SNI and hostname %s provided" |
| " via HTTP are different", servername, host); |
| return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST; |
| } |
| } |
| else if ((((mySrvConfig(r->server))->strict_sni_vhost_check |
| == SSL_ENABLED_TRUE) |
| || (mySrvConfig(sslconn->server))->strict_sni_vhost_check |
| == SSL_ENABLED_TRUE) |
| && r->connection->vhost_lookup_data) { |
| /* |
| * We are using a name based configuration here, but no hostname was |
| * provided via SNI. Don't allow that if are requested to do strict |
| * checking. Check wether this strict checking was setup either in the |
| * server config we used for handshaking or in our current server. |
| * This should avoid insecure configuration by accident. |
| */ |
| ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server, |
| "No hostname was provided via SNI for a name based" |
| " virtual host"); |
| return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; |
| } |
| #endif |
| SSL_set_app_data2(ssl, r); |
| |
| /* |
| * Log information about incoming HTTPS requests |
| */ |
| if (r->server->loglevel >= APLOG_INFO && ap_is_initial_req(r)) { |
| ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r->server, |
| "%s HTTPS request received for child %ld (server %s)", |
| (r->connection->keepalives <= 0 ? |
| "Initial (No.1)" : |
| apr_psprintf(r->pool, "Subsequent (No.%d)", |
| r->connection->keepalives+1)), |
| r->connection->id, |
| ssl_util_vhostid(r->pool, r->server)); |
| } |
| |
| /* SetEnvIf ssl-*-shutdown flags can only be per-server, |
| * so they won't change across keepalive requests |
| */ |
| if (sslconn->shutdown_type == SSL_SHUTDOWN_TYPE_UNSET) { |
| ssl_configure_env(r, sslconn); |
| } |
| |
| return DECLINED; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Move SetEnvIf information from request_rec to conn_rec/BUFF |
| * to allow the close connection handler to use them. |
| */ |
| |
| static void ssl_configure_env(request_rec *r, SSLConnRec *sslconn) |
| { |
| int i; |
| const apr_array_header_t *arr = apr_table_elts(r->subprocess_env); |
| const apr_table_entry_t *elts = (const apr_table_entry_t *)arr->elts; |
| |
| sslconn->shutdown_type = SSL_SHUTDOWN_TYPE_STANDARD; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < arr->nelts; i++) { |
| const char *key = elts[i].key; |
| |
| switch (*key) { |
| case 's': |
| /* being case-sensitive here. |
| * and not checking for the -shutdown since these are the only |
| * SetEnvIf "flags" we support |
| */ |
| if (!strncmp(key+1, "sl-", 3)) { |
| key += 4; |
| if (!strncmp(key, "unclean", 7)) { |
| sslconn->shutdown_type = SSL_SHUTDOWN_TYPE_UNCLEAN; |
| } |
| else if (!strncmp(key, "accurate", 8)) { |
| sslconn->shutdown_type = SSL_SHUTDOWN_TYPE_ACCURATE; |
| } |
| return; /* should only ever be one ssl-*-shutdown */ |
| } |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Access Handler |
| */ |
| int ssl_hook_Access(request_rec *r) |
| { |
| SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfig(r); |
| SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(r->server); |
| SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection); |
| SSL *ssl = sslconn ? sslconn->ssl : NULL; |
| server_rec *handshakeserver = sslconn ? sslconn->server : NULL; |
| SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL; |
| apr_array_header_t *requires; |
| ssl_require_t *ssl_requires; |
| char *cp; |
| int ok, i; |
| BOOL renegotiate = FALSE, renegotiate_quick = FALSE; |
| X509 *cert; |
| X509 *peercert; |
| X509_STORE *cert_store = NULL; |
| X509_STORE_CTX cert_store_ctx; |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_old = NULL, *cipher_list = NULL; |
| const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; |
| int depth, verify_old, verify, n; |
| |
| if (ssl) { |
| ctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(ssl); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Support for SSLRequireSSL directive |
| */ |
| if (dc->bSSLRequired && !ssl) { |
| if (sc->enabled == SSL_ENABLED_OPTIONAL) { |
| /* This vhost was configured for optional SSL, just tell the |
| * client that we need to upgrade. |
| */ |
| apr_table_setn(r->err_headers_out, "Upgrade", "TLS/1.0, HTTP/1.1"); |
| apr_table_setn(r->err_headers_out, "Connection", "Upgrade"); |
| |
| return HTTP_UPGRADE_REQUIRED; |
| } |
| |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, |
| "access to %s failed, reason: %s", |
| r->filename, "SSL connection required"); |
| |
| /* remember forbidden access for strict require option */ |
| apr_table_setn(r->notes, "ssl-access-forbidden", "1"); |
| |
| return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check to see whether SSL is in use; if it's not, then no |
| * further access control checks are relevant. (the test for |
| * sc->enabled is probably strictly unnecessary) |
| */ |
| if (sc->enabled == SSL_ENABLED_FALSE || !ssl) { |
| return DECLINED; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Support for per-directory reconfigured SSL connection parameters. |
| * |
| * This is implemented by forcing an SSL renegotiation with the |
| * reconfigured parameter suite. But Apache's internal API processing |
| * makes our life very hard here, because when internal sub-requests occur |
| * we nevertheless should avoid multiple unnecessary SSL handshakes (they |
| * require extra network I/O and especially time to perform). |
| * |
| * But the optimization for filtering out the unnecessary handshakes isn't |
| * obvious and trivial. Especially because while Apache is in its |
| * sub-request processing the client could force additional handshakes, |
| * too. And these take place perhaps without our notice. So the only |
| * possibility is to explicitly _ask_ OpenSSL whether the renegotiation |
| * has to be performed or not. It has to performed when some parameters |
| * which were previously known (by us) are not those we've now |
| * reconfigured (as known by OpenSSL) or (in optimized way) at least when |
| * the reconfigured parameter suite is stronger (more restrictions) than |
| * the currently active one. |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Override of SSLCipherSuite |
| * |
| * We provide two options here: |
| * |
| * o The paranoid and default approach where we force a renegotiation when |
| * the cipher suite changed in _any_ way (which is straight-forward but |
| * often forces renegotiations too often and is perhaps not what the |
| * user actually wanted). |
| * |
| * o The optimized and still secure way where we force a renegotiation |
| * only if the currently active cipher is no longer contained in the |
| * reconfigured/new cipher suite. Any other changes are not important |
| * because it's the servers choice to select a cipher from the ones the |
| * client supports. So as long as the current cipher is still in the new |
| * cipher suite we're happy. Because we can assume we would have |
| * selected it again even when other (better) ciphers exists now in the |
| * new cipher suite. This approach is fine because the user explicitly |
| * has to enable this via ``SSLOptions +OptRenegotiate''. So we do no |
| * implicit optimizations. |
| */ |
| if (dc->szCipherSuite || (r->server != handshakeserver)) { |
| /* remember old state */ |
| |
| if (dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_OPTRENEGOTIATE) { |
| cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl); |
| } |
| else { |
| cipher_list_old = (STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *)SSL_get_ciphers(ssl); |
| |
| if (cipher_list_old) { |
| cipher_list_old = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipher_list_old); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* configure new state */ |
| if ((dc->szCipherSuite || sc->server->auth.cipher_suite) && |
| !modssl_set_cipher_list(ssl, dc->szCipherSuite ? |
| dc->szCipherSuite : |
| sc->server->auth.cipher_suite)) { |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, r, |
| "Unable to reconfigure (per-directory) " |
| "permitted SSL ciphers"); |
| ssl_log_ssl_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r->server); |
| |
| if (cipher_list_old) { |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_list_old); |
| } |
| |
| return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; |
| } |
| |
| /* determine whether a renegotiation has to be forced */ |
| cipher_list = (STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *)SSL_get_ciphers(ssl); |
| |
| if (dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_OPTRENEGOTIATE) { |
| /* optimized way */ |
| if ((!cipher && cipher_list) || |
| (cipher && !cipher_list)) |
| { |
| renegotiate = TRUE; |
| } |
| else if (cipher && cipher_list && |
| (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(cipher_list, cipher) < 0)) |
| { |
| renegotiate = TRUE; |
| } |
| } |
| else { |
| /* paranoid way */ |
| if ((!cipher_list_old && cipher_list) || |
| (cipher_list_old && !cipher_list)) |
| { |
| renegotiate = TRUE; |
| } |
| else if (cipher_list_old && cipher_list) { |
| for (n = 0; |
| !renegotiate && (n < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_list)); |
| n++) |
| { |
| SSL_CIPHER *value = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_list, n); |
| |
| if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(cipher_list_old, value) < 0) { |
| renegotiate = TRUE; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| for (n = 0; |
| !renegotiate && (n < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_list_old)); |
| n++) |
| { |
| SSL_CIPHER *value = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_list_old, n); |
| |
| if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(cipher_list, value) < 0) { |
| renegotiate = TRUE; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* cleanup */ |
| if (cipher_list_old) { |
| sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_list_old); |
| } |
| |
| if (renegotiate) { |
| #ifdef SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE |
| if (sc->cipher_server_pref == TRUE) { |
| SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE); |
| } |
| #endif |
| /* tracing */ |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, |
| "Reconfigured cipher suite will force renegotiation"); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * override of SSLVerifyDepth |
| * |
| * The depth checks are handled by us manually inside the verify callback |
| * function and not by OpenSSL internally (and our function is aware of |
| * both the per-server and per-directory contexts). So we cannot ask |
| * OpenSSL about the currently verify depth. Instead we remember it in our |
| * SSLConnRec attached to the SSL* of OpenSSL. We've to force the |
| * renegotiation if the reconfigured/new verify depth is less than the |
| * currently active/remembered verify depth (because this means more |
| * restriction on the certificate chain). |
| */ |
| n = sslconn->verify_depth ? |
| sslconn->verify_depth : |
| (mySrvConfig(handshakeserver))->server->auth.verify_depth; |
| /* determine the new depth */ |
| sslconn->verify_depth = (dc->nVerifyDepth != UNSET) ? |
| dc->nVerifyDepth : sc->server->auth.verify_depth; |
| if (sslconn->verify_depth < n) { |
| renegotiate = TRUE; |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, |
| "Reduced client verification depth will force " |
| "renegotiation"); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * override of SSLVerifyClient |
| * |
| * We force a renegotiation if the reconfigured/new verify type is |
| * stronger than the currently active verify type. |
| * |
| * The order is: none << optional_no_ca << optional << require |
| * |
| * Additionally the following optimization is possible here: When the |
| * currently active verify type is "none" but a client certificate is |
| * already known/present, it's enough to manually force a client |
| * verification but at least skip the I/O-intensive renegotation |
| * handshake. |
| */ |
| if ((dc->nVerifyClient != SSL_CVERIFY_UNSET) || |
| (sc->server->auth.verify_mode != SSL_CVERIFY_UNSET)) { |
| /* remember old state */ |
| verify_old = SSL_get_verify_mode(ssl); |
| /* configure new state */ |
| verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; |
| |
| if ((dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_REQUIRE) || |
| (sc->server->auth.verify_mode == SSL_CVERIFY_REQUIRE)) { |
| verify |= SSL_VERIFY_PEER_STRICT; |
| } |
| |
| if ((dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL) || |
| (dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL_NO_CA) || |
| (sc->server->auth.verify_mode == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL) || |
| (sc->server->auth.verify_mode == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL_NO_CA)) |
| { |
| verify |= SSL_VERIFY_PEER; |
| } |
| |
| modssl_set_verify(ssl, verify, ssl_callback_SSLVerify); |
| SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_V_OK); |
| |
| /* determine whether we've to force a renegotiation */ |
| if (!renegotiate && verify != verify_old) { |
| if (((verify_old == SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && |
| (verify != SSL_VERIFY_NONE)) || |
| |
| (!(verify_old & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && |
| (verify & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) || |
| |
| (!(verify_old & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) && |
| (verify & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))) |
| { |
| renegotiate = TRUE; |
| /* optimization */ |
| |
| if ((dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_OPTRENEGOTIATE) && |
| (verify_old == SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && |
| ((peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) != NULL)) |
| { |
| renegotiate_quick = TRUE; |
| X509_free(peercert); |
| } |
| |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, |
| "Changed client verification type will force " |
| "%srenegotiation", |
| renegotiate_quick ? "quick " : ""); |
| } |
| } |
| /* If we're handling a request for a vhost other than the default one, |
| * then we need to make sure that client authentication is properly |
| * enforced. For clients supplying an SNI extension, the peer |
| * certificate verification has happened in the handshake already |
| * (and r->server == handshakeserver). For non-SNI requests, |
| * an additional check is needed here. If client authentication |
| * is configured as mandatory, then we can only proceed if the |
| * CA list doesn't have to be changed (OpenSSL doesn't provide |
| * an option to change the list for an existing session). |
| */ |
| if ((r->server != handshakeserver) |
| && renegotiate |
| && ((verify & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || |
| (verify & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT))) { |
| SSLSrvConfigRec *hssc = mySrvConfig(handshakeserver); |
| |
| #define MODSSL_CFG_CA_NE(f, sc1, sc2) \ |
| (sc1->server->auth.f && \ |
| (!sc2->server->auth.f || \ |
| strNE(sc1->server->auth.f, sc2->server->auth.f))) |
| |
| if (MODSSL_CFG_CA_NE(ca_cert_file, sc, hssc) || |
| MODSSL_CFG_CA_NE(ca_cert_path, sc, hssc)) { |
| if (verify & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT) { |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, |
| "Non-default virtual host with SSLVerify set to " |
| "'require' and VirtualHost-specific CA certificate " |
| "list is only available to clients with TLS server " |
| "name indication (SNI) support"); |
| modssl_set_verify(ssl, verify_old, NULL); |
| return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; |
| } else |
| /* let it pass, possibly with an "incorrect" peer cert, |
| * so make sure the SSL_CLIENT_VERIFY environment variable |
| * will indicate partial success only, later on. |
| */ |
| sslconn->verify_info = "GENEROUS"; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * override SSLCACertificateFile & SSLCACertificatePath |
| * This is only enabled if the SSL_set_cert_store() function |
| * is available in the ssl library. the 1.x based mod_ssl |
| * used SSL_CTX_set_cert_store which is not thread safe. |
| */ |
| |
| #ifdef HAVE_SSL_SET_CERT_STORE |
| /* |
| * check if per-dir and per-server config field are not the same. |
| * if f is defined in per-dir and not defined in per-server |
| * or f is defined in both but not the equal ... |
| */ |
| #define MODSSL_CFG_NE(f) \ |
| (dc->f && (!sc->f || (sc->f && strNE(dc->f, sc->f)))) |
| |
| #define MODSSL_CFG_CA(f) \ |
| (dc->f ? dc->f : sc->f) |
| |
| if (MODSSL_CFG_NE(szCACertificateFile) || |
| MODSSL_CFG_NE(szCACertificatePath)) |
| { |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_list; |
| const char *ca_file = MODSSL_CFG_CA(szCACertificateFile); |
| const char *ca_path = MODSSL_CFG_CA(szCACertificatePath); |
| |
| cert_store = X509_STORE_new(); |
| |
| if (!X509_STORE_load_locations(cert_store, ca_file, ca_path)) { |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, |
| "Unable to reconfigure verify locations " |
| "for client authentication"); |
| ssl_log_ssl_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r->server); |
| |
| X509_STORE_free(cert_store); |
| |
| return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL_free will free cert_store */ |
| SSL_set_cert_store(ssl, cert_store); |
| |
| if (!(ca_list = ssl_init_FindCAList(r->server, r->pool, |
| ca_file, ca_path))) |
| { |
| ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r->server, |
| "Unable to determine list of available " |
| "CA certificates for client authentication"); |
| |
| return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; |
| } |
| |
| SSL_set_client_CA_list(ssl, ca_list); |
| renegotiate = TRUE; |
| |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, |
| "Changed client verification locations will force " |
| "renegotiation"); |
| } |
| #endif /* HAVE_SSL_SET_CERT_STORE */ |
| |
| /* If a renegotiation is now required for this location, and the |
| * request includes a message body (and the client has not |
| * requested a "100 Continue" response), then the client will be |
| * streaming the request body over the wire already. In that |
| * case, it is not possible to stop and perform a new SSL |
| * handshake immediately; once the SSL library moves to the |
| * "accept" state, it will reject the SSL packets which the client |
| * is sending for the request body. |
| * |
| * To allow authentication to complete in this auth hook, the |
| * solution used here is to fill a (bounded) buffer with the |
| * request body, and then to reinject that request body later. |
| */ |
| if (renegotiate && !renegotiate_quick |
| && (apr_table_get(r->headers_in, "transfer-encoding") |
| || (apr_table_get(r->headers_in, "content-length") |
| && strcmp(apr_table_get(r->headers_in, "content-length"), "0"))) |
| && !r->expecting_100) { |
| int rv; |
| apr_size_t rsize; |
| |
| rsize = dc->nRenegBufferSize == UNSET ? DEFAULT_RENEG_BUFFER_SIZE : |
| dc->nRenegBufferSize; |
| if (rsize > 0) { |
| /* Fill the I/O buffer with the request body if possible. */ |
| rv = ssl_io_buffer_fill(r, rsize); |
| } |
| else { |
| /* If the reneg buffer size is set to zero, just fail. */ |
| rv = HTTP_REQUEST_ENTITY_TOO_LARGE; |
| } |
| |
| if (rv) { |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, |
| "could not buffer message body to allow " |
| "SSL renegotiation to proceed"); |
| return rv; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * now do the renegotiation if anything was actually reconfigured |
| */ |
| if (renegotiate) { |
| /* |
| * Now we force the SSL renegotation by sending the Hello Request |
| * message to the client. Here we have to do a workaround: Actually |
| * OpenSSL returns immediately after sending the Hello Request (the |
| * intent AFAIK is because the SSL/TLS protocol says it's not a must |
| * that the client replies to a Hello Request). But because we insist |
| * on a reply (anything else is an error for us) we have to go to the |
| * ACCEPT state manually. Using SSL_set_accept_state() doesn't work |
| * here because it resets too much of the connection. So we set the |
| * state explicitly and continue the handshake manually. |
| */ |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, |
| "Requesting connection re-negotiation"); |
| |
| if (renegotiate_quick) { |
| STACK_OF(X509) *cert_stack; |
| |
| /* perform just a manual re-verification of the peer */ |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, |
| "Performing quick renegotiation: " |
| "just re-verifying the peer"); |
| |
| cert_stack = (STACK_OF(X509) *)SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl); |
| |
| cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl); |
| |
| if (!cert_stack && cert) { |
| /* client cert is in the session cache, but there is |
| * no chain, since ssl3_get_client_certificate() |
| * sk_X509_shift-ed the peer cert out of the chain. |
| * we put it back here for the purpose of quick_renegotiation. |
| */ |
| cert_stack = sk_X509_new_null(); |
| sk_X509_push(cert_stack, MODSSL_PCHAR_CAST cert); |
| } |
| |
| if (!cert_stack || (sk_X509_num(cert_stack) == 0)) { |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, |
| "Cannot find peer certificate chain"); |
| |
| return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; |
| } |
| |
| if (!(cert_store || |
| (cert_store = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx)))) |
| { |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, |
| "Cannot find certificate storage"); |
| |
| return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; |
| } |
| |
| if (!cert) { |
| cert = sk_X509_value(cert_stack, 0); |
| } |
| |
| X509_STORE_CTX_init(&cert_store_ctx, cert_store, cert, cert_stack); |
| depth = SSL_get_verify_depth(ssl); |
| |
| if (depth >= 0) { |
| X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(&cert_store_ctx, depth); |
| } |
| |
| X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(&cert_store_ctx, |
| SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), |
| (char *)ssl); |
| |
| if (!modssl_X509_verify_cert(&cert_store_ctx)) { |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, |
| "Re-negotiation verification step failed"); |
| ssl_log_ssl_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r->server); |
| } |
| |
| SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, cert_store_ctx.error); |
| X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&cert_store_ctx); |
| |
| if (cert_stack != SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl)) { |
| /* we created this ourselves, so free it */ |
| sk_X509_pop_free(cert_stack, X509_free); |
| } |
| } |
| else { |
| request_rec *id = r->main ? r->main : r; |
| |
| /* Additional mitigation for CVE-2009-3555: At this point, |
| * before renegotiating, an (entire) request has been read |
| * from the connection. An attacker may have sent further |
| * data to "prefix" any subsequent request by the victim's |
| * client after the renegotiation; this data may already |
| * have been read and buffered. Forcing a connection |
| * closure after the response ensures such data will be |
| * discarded. Legimately pipelined HTTP requests will be |
| * retried anyway with this approach. */ |
| if (has_buffered_data(r)) { |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, |
| "insecure SSL re-negotiation required, but " |
| "a pipelined request is present; keepalive " |
| "disabled"); |
| r->connection->keepalive = AP_CONN_CLOSE; |
| } |
| |
| /* Perform a full renegotiation. */ |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, r, |
| "Performing full renegotiation: complete handshake " |
| "protocol (%s support secure renegotiation)", |
| #if defined(SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support) |
| SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl) ? |
| "client does" : "client does not" |
| #else |
| "server does not" |
| #endif |
| ); |
| |
| SSL_set_session_id_context(ssl, |
| (unsigned char *)&id, |
| sizeof(id)); |
| |
| /* Toggle the renegotiation state to allow the new |
| * handshake to proceed. */ |
| sslconn->reneg_state = RENEG_ALLOW; |
| |
| SSL_renegotiate(ssl); |
| SSL_do_handshake(ssl); |
| |
| if (SSL_get_state(ssl) != SSL_ST_OK) { |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, |
| "Re-negotiation request failed"); |
| ssl_log_ssl_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, r->server); |
| |
| r->connection->aborted = 1; |
| return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; |
| } |
| |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, |
| "Awaiting re-negotiation handshake"); |
| |
| /* XXX: Should replace SSL_set_state with SSL_renegotiate(ssl); |
| * However, this causes failures in perl-framework currently, |
| * perhaps pre-test if we have already negotiated? |
| */ |
| SSL_set_state(ssl, SSL_ST_ACCEPT); |
| SSL_do_handshake(ssl); |
| |
| sslconn->reneg_state = RENEG_REJECT; |
| |
| if (SSL_get_state(ssl) != SSL_ST_OK) { |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, |
| "Re-negotiation handshake failed: " |
| "Not accepted by client!?"); |
| |
| r->connection->aborted = 1; |
| return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Remember the peer certificate's DN |
| */ |
| if ((cert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl))) { |
| if (sslconn->client_cert) { |
| X509_free(sslconn->client_cert); |
| } |
| sslconn->client_cert = cert; |
| sslconn->client_dn = NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Finally check for acceptable renegotiation results |
| */ |
| if ((dc->nVerifyClient != SSL_CVERIFY_NONE) || |
| (sc->server->auth.verify_mode != SSL_CVERIFY_NONE)) { |
| BOOL do_verify = ((dc->nVerifyClient == SSL_CVERIFY_REQUIRE) || |
| (sc->server->auth.verify_mode == SSL_CVERIFY_REQUIRE)); |
| |
| if (do_verify && (SSL_get_verify_result(ssl) != X509_V_OK)) { |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, |
| "Re-negotiation handshake failed: " |
| "Client verification failed"); |
| |
| return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; |
| } |
| |
| if (do_verify) { |
| if ((peercert = SSL_get_peer_certificate(ssl)) == NULL) { |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, |
| "Re-negotiation handshake failed: " |
| "Client certificate missing"); |
| |
| return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; |
| } |
| |
| X509_free(peercert); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Also check that SSLCipherSuite has been enforced as expected. |
| */ |
| if (cipher_list) { |
| cipher = SSL_get_current_cipher(ssl); |
| if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(cipher_list, cipher) < 0) { |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, |
| "SSL cipher suite not renegotiated: " |
| "access to %s denied using cipher %s", |
| r->filename, |
| SSL_CIPHER_get_name(cipher)); |
| return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* If we're trying to have the user name set from a client |
| * certificate then we need to set it here. This should be safe as |
| * the user name probably isn't important from an auth checking point |
| * of view as the certificate supplied acts in that capacity. |
| * However, if FakeAuth is being used then this isn't the case so |
| * we need to postpone setting the username until later. |
| */ |
| if ((dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_FAKEBASICAUTH) == 0 && dc->szUserName) { |
| char *val = ssl_var_lookup(r->pool, r->server, r->connection, |
| r, (char *)dc->szUserName); |
| if (val && val[0]) |
| r->user = val; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check SSLRequire boolean expressions |
| */ |
| requires = dc->aRequirement; |
| ssl_requires = (ssl_require_t *)requires->elts; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < requires->nelts; i++) { |
| ssl_require_t *req = &ssl_requires[i]; |
| ok = ssl_expr_exec(r, req->mpExpr); |
| |
| if (ok < 0) { |
| cp = apr_psprintf(r->pool, |
| "Failed to execute " |
| "SSL requirement expression: %s", |
| ssl_expr_get_error()); |
| |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, |
| "access to %s failed, reason: %s", |
| r->filename, cp); |
| |
| /* remember forbidden access for strict require option */ |
| apr_table_setn(r->notes, "ssl-access-forbidden", "1"); |
| |
| return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; |
| } |
| |
| if (ok != 1) { |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, |
| "Access to %s denied for %s " |
| "(requirement expression not fulfilled)", |
| r->filename, r->connection->remote_ip); |
| |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, |
| "Failed expression: %s", req->cpExpr); |
| |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, |
| "access to %s failed, reason: %s", |
| r->filename, |
| "SSL requirement expression not fulfilled " |
| "(see SSL logfile for more details)"); |
| |
| /* remember forbidden access for strict require option */ |
| apr_table_setn(r->notes, "ssl-access-forbidden", "1"); |
| |
| return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Else access is granted from our point of view (except vendor |
| * handlers override). But we have to return DECLINED here instead |
| * of OK, because mod_auth and other modules still might want to |
| * deny access. |
| */ |
| |
| return DECLINED; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Authentication Handler: |
| * Fake a Basic authentication from the X509 client certificate. |
| * |
| * This must be run fairly early on to prevent a real authentication from |
| * occuring, in particular it must be run before anything else that |
| * authenticates a user. This means that the Module statement for this |
| * module should be LAST in the Configuration file. |
| */ |
| int ssl_hook_UserCheck(request_rec *r) |
| { |
| SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection); |
| SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(r->server); |
| SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfig(r); |
| char *clientdn; |
| const char *auth_line, *username, *password; |
| |
| /* |
| * Additionally forbid access (again) |
| * when strict require option is used. |
| */ |
| if ((dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_STRICTREQUIRE) && |
| (apr_table_get(r->notes, "ssl-access-forbidden"))) |
| { |
| return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * We decline when we are in a subrequest. The Authorization header |
| * would already be present if it was added in the main request. |
| */ |
| if (!ap_is_initial_req(r)) { |
| return DECLINED; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Make sure the user is not able to fake the client certificate |
| * based authentication by just entering an X.509 Subject DN |
| * ("/XX=YYY/XX=YYY/..") as the username and "password" as the |
| * password. |
| */ |
| if ((auth_line = apr_table_get(r->headers_in, "Authorization"))) { |
| if (strcEQ(ap_getword(r->pool, &auth_line, ' '), "Basic")) { |
| while ((*auth_line == ' ') || (*auth_line == '\t')) { |
| auth_line++; |
| } |
| |
| auth_line = ap_pbase64decode(r->pool, auth_line); |
| username = ap_getword_nulls(r->pool, &auth_line, ':'); |
| password = auth_line; |
| |
| if ((username[0] == '/') && strEQ(password, "password")) { |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, r, |
| "Encountered FakeBasicAuth spoof: %s", username); |
| return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * We decline operation in various situations... |
| * - SSLOptions +FakeBasicAuth not configured |
| * - r->user already authenticated |
| * - ssl not enabled |
| * - client did not present a certificate |
| */ |
| if (!((sc->enabled == SSL_ENABLED_TRUE || sc->enabled == SSL_ENABLED_OPTIONAL) |
| && sslconn && sslconn->ssl && sslconn->client_cert) || |
| !(dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_FAKEBASICAUTH) || r->user) |
| { |
| return DECLINED; |
| } |
| |
| if (!sslconn->client_dn) { |
| X509_NAME *name = X509_get_subject_name(sslconn->client_cert); |
| char *cp = X509_NAME_oneline(name, NULL, 0); |
| sslconn->client_dn = apr_pstrdup(r->connection->pool, cp); |
| modssl_free(cp); |
| } |
| |
| clientdn = (char *)sslconn->client_dn; |
| |
| /* |
| * Fake a password - which one would be immaterial, as, it seems, an empty |
| * password in the users file would match ALL incoming passwords, if only |
| * we were using the standard crypt library routine. Unfortunately, OpenSSL |
| * "fixes" a "bug" in crypt and thus prevents blank passwords from |
| * working. (IMHO what they really fix is a bug in the users of the code |
| * - failing to program correctly for shadow passwords). We need, |
| * therefore, to provide a password. This password can be matched by |
| * adding the string "xxj31ZMTZzkVA" as the password in the user file. |
| * This is just the crypted variant of the word "password" ;-) |
| */ |
| auth_line = apr_pstrcat(r->pool, "Basic ", |
| ap_pbase64encode(r->pool, |
| apr_pstrcat(r->pool, clientdn, |
| ":password", NULL)), |
| NULL); |
| apr_table_set(r->headers_in, "Authorization", auth_line); |
| |
| ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, r, |
| "Faking HTTP Basic Auth header: \"Authorization: %s\"", |
| auth_line); |
| |
| return DECLINED; |
| } |
| |
| /* authorization phase */ |
| int ssl_hook_Auth(request_rec *r) |
| { |
| SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfig(r); |
| |
| /* |
| * Additionally forbid access (again) |
| * when strict require option is used. |
| */ |
| if ((dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_STRICTREQUIRE) && |
| (apr_table_get(r->notes, "ssl-access-forbidden"))) |
| { |
| return HTTP_FORBIDDEN; |
| } |
| |
| return DECLINED; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Fixup Handler |
| */ |
| |
| static const char *ssl_hook_Fixup_vars[] = { |
| "SSL_VERSION_INTERFACE", |
| "SSL_VERSION_LIBRARY", |
| "SSL_PROTOCOL", |
| "SSL_SECURE_RENEG", |
| "SSL_COMPRESS_METHOD", |
| "SSL_CIPHER", |
| "SSL_CIPHER_EXPORT", |
| "SSL_CIPHER_USEKEYSIZE", |
| "SSL_CIPHER_ALGKEYSIZE", |
| "SSL_CLIENT_VERIFY", |
| "SSL_CLIENT_M_VERSION", |
| "SSL_CLIENT_M_SERIAL", |
| "SSL_CLIENT_V_START", |
| "SSL_CLIENT_V_END", |
| "SSL_CLIENT_V_REMAIN", |
| "SSL_CLIENT_S_DN", |
| "SSL_CLIENT_I_DN", |
| "SSL_CLIENT_A_KEY", |
| "SSL_CLIENT_A_SIG", |
| "SSL_SERVER_M_VERSION", |
| "SSL_SERVER_M_SERIAL", |
| "SSL_SERVER_V_START", |
| "SSL_SERVER_V_END", |
| "SSL_SERVER_S_DN", |
| "SSL_SERVER_I_DN", |
| "SSL_SERVER_A_KEY", |
| "SSL_SERVER_A_SIG", |
| "SSL_SESSION_ID", |
| NULL |
| }; |
| |
| int ssl_hook_Fixup(request_rec *r) |
| { |
| SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(r->connection); |
| SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(r->server); |
| SSLDirConfigRec *dc = myDirConfig(r); |
| apr_table_t *env = r->subprocess_env; |
| char *var, *val = ""; |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| const char *servername; |
| #endif |
| STACK_OF(X509) *peer_certs; |
| SSL *ssl; |
| int i; |
| |
| if (sc->enabled == SSL_ENABLED_OPTIONAL && !(sslconn && sslconn->ssl)) { |
| apr_table_setn(r->headers_out, "Upgrade", "TLS/1.0, HTTP/1.1"); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check to see if SSL is on |
| */ |
| if (!(((sc->enabled == SSL_ENABLED_TRUE) || (sc->enabled == SSL_ENABLED_OPTIONAL)) && sslconn && (ssl = sslconn->ssl))) { |
| return DECLINED; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Annotate the SSI/CGI environment with standard SSL information |
| */ |
| /* the always present HTTPS (=HTTP over SSL) flag! */ |
| apr_table_setn(env, "HTTPS", "on"); |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| /* add content of SNI TLS extension (if supplied with ClientHello) */ |
| if ((servername = SSL_get_servername(ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name))) { |
| apr_table_set(env, "SSL_TLS_SNI", servername); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* standard SSL environment variables */ |
| if (dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_STDENVVARS) { |
| modssl_var_extract_dns(env, sslconn->ssl, r->pool); |
| |
| for (i = 0; ssl_hook_Fixup_vars[i]; i++) { |
| var = (char *)ssl_hook_Fixup_vars[i]; |
| val = ssl_var_lookup(r->pool, r->server, r->connection, r, var); |
| if (!strIsEmpty(val)) { |
| apr_table_setn(env, var, val); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * On-demand bloat up the SSI/CGI environment with certificate data |
| */ |
| if (dc->nOptions & SSL_OPT_EXPORTCERTDATA) { |
| val = ssl_var_lookup(r->pool, r->server, r->connection, |
| r, "SSL_SERVER_CERT"); |
| |
| apr_table_setn(env, "SSL_SERVER_CERT", val); |
| |
| val = ssl_var_lookup(r->pool, r->server, r->connection, |
| r, "SSL_CLIENT_CERT"); |
| |
| apr_table_setn(env, "SSL_CLIENT_CERT", val); |
| |
| if ((peer_certs = (STACK_OF(X509) *)SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(ssl))) { |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(peer_certs); i++) { |
| var = apr_psprintf(r->pool, "SSL_CLIENT_CERT_CHAIN_%d", i); |
| val = ssl_var_lookup(r->pool, r->server, r->connection, |
| r, var); |
| if (val) { |
| apr_table_setn(env, var, val); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| |
| #ifdef SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support |
| apr_table_setn(r->notes, "ssl-secure-reneg", |
| SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl) ? "1" : "0"); |
| #endif |
| |
| return DECLINED; |
| } |
| |
| /* _________________________________________________________________ |
| ** |
| ** OpenSSL Callback Functions |
| ** _________________________________________________________________ |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Handle out temporary RSA private keys on demand |
| * |
| * The background of this as the TLSv1 standard explains it: |
| * |
| * | D.1. Temporary RSA keys |
| * | |
| * | US Export restrictions limit RSA keys used for encryption to 512 |
| * | bits, but do not place any limit on lengths of RSA keys used for |
| * | signing operations. Certificates often need to be larger than 512 |
| * | bits, since 512-bit RSA keys are not secure enough for high-value |
| * | transactions or for applications requiring long-term security. Some |
| * | certificates are also designated signing-only, in which case they |
| * | cannot be used for key exchange. |
| * | |
| * | When the public key in the certificate cannot be used for encryption, |
| * | the server signs a temporary RSA key, which is then exchanged. In |
| * | exportable applications, the temporary RSA key should be the maximum |
| * | allowable length (i.e., 512 bits). Because 512-bit RSA keys are |
| * | relatively insecure, they should be changed often. For typical |
| * | electronic commerce applications, it is suggested that keys be |
| * | changed daily or every 500 transactions, and more often if possible. |
| * | Note that while it is acceptable to use the same temporary key for |
| * | multiple transactions, it must be signed each time it is used. |
| * | |
| * | RSA key generation is a time-consuming process. In many cases, a |
| * | low-priority process can be assigned the task of key generation. |
| * | Whenever a new key is completed, the existing temporary key can be |
| * | replaced with the new one. |
| * |
| * XXX: base on comment above, if thread support is enabled, |
| * we should spawn a low-priority thread to generate new keys |
| * on the fly. |
| * |
| * So we generated 512 and 1024 bit temporary keys on startup |
| * which we now just hand out on demand.... |
| */ |
| |
| RSA *ssl_callback_TmpRSA(SSL *ssl, int export, int keylen) |
| { |
| conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl); |
| SSLModConfigRec *mc = myModConfigFromConn(c); |
| int idx; |
| |
| ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c, |
| "handing out temporary %d bit RSA key", keylen); |
| |
| /* doesn't matter if export flag is on, |
| * we won't be asked for keylen > 512 in that case. |
| * if we are asked for a keylen > 1024, it is too expensive |
| * to generate on the fly. |
| * XXX: any reason not to generate 2048 bit keys at startup? |
| */ |
| |
| switch (keylen) { |
| case 512: |
| idx = SSL_TMP_KEY_RSA_512; |
| break; |
| |
| case 1024: |
| default: |
| idx = SSL_TMP_KEY_RSA_1024; |
| } |
| |
| return (RSA *)mc->pTmpKeys[idx]; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Hand out the already generated DH parameters... |
| */ |
| DH *ssl_callback_TmpDH(SSL *ssl, int export, int keylen) |
| { |
| conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl); |
| SSLModConfigRec *mc = myModConfigFromConn(c); |
| int idx; |
| |
| ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c, |
| "handing out temporary %d bit DH key", keylen); |
| |
| switch (keylen) { |
| case 512: |
| idx = SSL_TMP_KEY_DH_512; |
| break; |
| |
| case 1024: |
| default: |
| idx = SSL_TMP_KEY_DH_1024; |
| } |
| |
| return (DH *)mc->pTmpKeys[idx]; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This OpenSSL callback function is called when OpenSSL |
| * does client authentication and verifies the certificate chain. |
| */ |
| int ssl_callback_SSLVerify(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) |
| { |
| /* Get Apache context back through OpenSSL context */ |
| SSL *ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, |
| SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()); |
| conn_rec *conn = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl); |
| request_rec *r = (request_rec *)SSL_get_app_data2(ssl); |
| server_rec *s = r ? r->server : mySrvFromConn(conn); |
| |
| SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s); |
| SSLDirConfigRec *dc = r ? myDirConfig(r) : NULL; |
| SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(conn); |
| modssl_ctx_t *mctx = myCtxConfig(sslconn, sc); |
| |
| /* Get verify ingredients */ |
| int errnum = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); |
| int errdepth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx); |
| int depth, verify; |
| |
| /* |
| * Log verification information |
| */ |
| if (s->loglevel >= APLOG_DEBUG) { |
| X509 *cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); |
| char *sname = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0); |
| char *iname = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), NULL, 0); |
| |
| ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, conn, |
| "Certificate Verification: " |
| "depth: %d, subject: %s, issuer: %s", |
| errdepth, |
| sname ? sname : "-unknown-", |
| iname ? iname : "-unknown-"); |
| |
| if (sname) { |
| modssl_free(sname); |
| } |
| |
| if (iname) { |
| modssl_free(iname); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check for optionally acceptable non-verifiable issuer situation |
| */ |
| if (dc && (dc->nVerifyClient != SSL_CVERIFY_UNSET)) { |
| verify = dc->nVerifyClient; |
| } |
| else { |
| verify = mctx->auth.verify_mode; |
| } |
| |
| if (verify == SSL_CVERIFY_NONE) { |
| /* |
| * SSLProxyVerify is either not configured or set to "none". |
| * (this callback doesn't happen in the server context if SSLVerify |
| * is not configured or set to "none") |
| */ |
| return TRUE; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl_verify_error_is_optional(errnum) && |
| (verify == SSL_CVERIFY_OPTIONAL_NO_CA)) |
| { |
| ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, conn, |
| "Certificate Verification: Verifiable Issuer is " |
| "configured as optional, therefore we're accepting " |
| "the certificate"); |
| |
| sslconn->verify_info = "GENEROUS"; |
| ok = TRUE; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Additionally perform CRL-based revocation checks |
| */ |
| if (ok) { |
| if (!(ok = ssl_callback_SSLVerify_CRL(ok, ctx, conn))) { |
| errnum = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * If we already know it's not ok, log the real reason |
| */ |
| if (!ok) { |
| ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, conn, |
| "Certificate Verification: Error (%d): %s", |
| errnum, X509_verify_cert_error_string(errnum)); |
| |
| if (sslconn->client_cert) { |
| X509_free(sslconn->client_cert); |
| sslconn->client_cert = NULL; |
| } |
| sslconn->client_dn = NULL; |
| sslconn->verify_error = X509_verify_cert_error_string(errnum); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Finally check the depth of the certificate verification |
| */ |
| if (dc && (dc->nVerifyDepth != UNSET)) { |
| depth = dc->nVerifyDepth; |
| } |
| else { |
| depth = mctx->auth.verify_depth; |
| } |
| |
| if (errdepth > depth) { |
| ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, conn, |
| "Certificate Verification: Certificate Chain too long " |
| "(chain has %d certificates, but maximum allowed are " |
| "only %d)", |
| errdepth, depth); |
| |
| errnum = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG; |
| sslconn->verify_error = X509_verify_cert_error_string(errnum); |
| |
| ok = FALSE; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * And finally signal OpenSSL the (perhaps changed) state |
| */ |
| return ok; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_callback_SSLVerify_CRL(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, conn_rec *c) |
| { |
| SSL *ssl = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx, |
| SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx()); |
| request_rec *r = (request_rec *)SSL_get_app_data2(ssl); |
| server_rec *s = r ? r->server : mySrvFromConn(c); |
| SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s); |
| SSLConnRec *sslconn = myConnConfig(c); |
| modssl_ctx_t *mctx = myCtxConfig(sslconn, sc); |
| X509_OBJECT obj; |
| X509_NAME *subject, *issuer; |
| X509 *cert; |
| X509_CRL *crl; |
| EVP_PKEY *pubkey; |
| int i, n, rc; |
| |
| /* |
| * Unless a revocation store for CRLs was created we |
| * cannot do any CRL-based verification, of course. |
| */ |
| if (!mctx->crl) { |
| return ok; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Determine certificate ingredients in advance |
| */ |
| cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); |
| subject = X509_get_subject_name(cert); |
| issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(cert); |
| |
| /* |
| * OpenSSL provides the general mechanism to deal with CRLs but does not |
| * use them automatically when verifying certificates, so we do it |
| * explicitly here. We will check the CRL for the currently checked |
| * certificate, if there is such a CRL in the store. |
| * |
| * We come through this procedure for each certificate in the certificate |
| * chain, starting with the root-CA's certificate. At each step we've to |
| * both verify the signature on the CRL (to make sure it's a valid CRL) |
| * and it's revocation list (to make sure the current certificate isn't |
| * revoked). But because to check the signature on the CRL we need the |
| * public key of the issuing CA certificate (which was already processed |
| * one round before), we've a little problem. But we can both solve it and |
| * at the same time optimize the processing by using the following |
| * verification scheme (idea and code snippets borrowed from the GLOBUS |
| * project): |
| * |
| * 1. We'll check the signature of a CRL in each step when we find a CRL |
| * through the _subject_ name of the current certificate. This CRL |
| * itself will be needed the first time in the next round, of course. |
| * But we do the signature processing one round before this where the |
| * public key of the CA is available. |
| * |
| * 2. We'll check the revocation list of a CRL in each step when |
| * we find a CRL through the _issuer_ name of the current certificate. |
| * This CRLs signature was then already verified one round before. |
| * |
| * This verification scheme allows a CA to revoke its own certificate as |
| * well, of course. |
| */ |
| |
| /* |
| * Try to retrieve a CRL corresponding to the _subject_ of |
| * the current certificate in order to verify it's integrity. |
| */ |
| memset((char *)&obj, 0, sizeof(obj)); |
| rc = SSL_X509_STORE_lookup(mctx->crl, |
| X509_LU_CRL, subject, &obj); |
| crl = obj.data.crl; |
| |
| if ((rc > 0) && crl) { |
| /* |
| * Log information about CRL |
| * (A little bit complicated because of ASN.1 and BIOs...) |
| */ |
| if (s->loglevel >= APLOG_DEBUG) { |
| char buff[512]; /* should be plenty */ |
| BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); |
| |
| BIO_printf(bio, "CA CRL: Issuer: "); |
| X509_NAME_print(bio, issuer, 0); |
| |
| BIO_printf(bio, ", lastUpdate: "); |
| ASN1_UTCTIME_print(bio, X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(crl)); |
| |
| BIO_printf(bio, ", nextUpdate: "); |
| ASN1_UTCTIME_print(bio, X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)); |
| |
| n = BIO_read(bio, buff, sizeof(buff) - 1); |
| buff[n] = '\0'; |
| |
| BIO_free(bio); |
| |
| ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s, "%s", buff); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Verify the signature on this CRL |
| */ |
| pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(cert); |
| rc = X509_CRL_verify(crl, pubkey); |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER |
| /* Only refcounted in OpenSSL */ |
| if (pubkey) |
| EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey); |
| #endif |
| if (rc <= 0) { |
| ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, s, |
| "Invalid signature on CRL"); |
| |
| X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE); |
| X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); |
| return FALSE; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check date of CRL to make sure it's not expired |
| */ |
| i = X509_cmp_current_time(X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(crl)); |
| |
| if (i == 0) { |
| ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, s, |
| "Found CRL has invalid nextUpdate field"); |
| |
| X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, |
| X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD); |
| X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); |
| |
| return FALSE; |
| } |
| |
| if (i < 0) { |
| ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, s, |
| "Found CRL is expired - " |
| "revoking all certificates until you get updated CRL"); |
| |
| X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED); |
| X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); |
| |
| return FALSE; |
| } |
| |
| X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Try to retrieve a CRL corresponding to the _issuer_ of |
| * the current certificate in order to check for revocation. |
| */ |
| memset((char *)&obj, 0, sizeof(obj)); |
| rc = SSL_X509_STORE_lookup(mctx->crl, |
| X509_LU_CRL, issuer, &obj); |
| |
| crl = obj.data.crl; |
| if ((rc > 0) && crl) { |
| /* |
| * Check if the current certificate is revoked by this CRL |
| */ |
| n = sk_X509_REVOKED_num(X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl)); |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { |
| X509_REVOKED *revoked = |
| sk_X509_REVOKED_value(X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(crl), i); |
| |
| ASN1_INTEGER *sn = X509_REVOKED_get_serialNumber(revoked); |
| |
| if (!ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(sn, X509_get_serialNumber(cert))) { |
| if (s->loglevel >= APLOG_DEBUG) { |
| char *cp = X509_NAME_oneline(issuer, NULL, 0); |
| long serial = ASN1_INTEGER_get(sn); |
| |
| ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, s, |
| "Certificate with serial %ld (0x%lX) " |
| "revoked per CRL from issuer %s", |
| serial, serial, cp); |
| modssl_free(cp); |
| } |
| |
| X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED); |
| X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); |
| |
| return FALSE; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| X509_OBJECT_free_contents(&obj); |
| } |
| |
| return ok; |
| } |
| |
| #define SSLPROXY_CERT_CB_LOG_FMT \ |
| "Proxy client certificate callback: (%s) " |
| |
| static void modssl_proxy_info_log(server_rec *s, |
| X509_INFO *info, |
| const char *msg) |
| { |
| SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s); |
| char name_buf[256]; |
| X509_NAME *name; |
| char *dn; |
| |
| if (s->loglevel < APLOG_DEBUG) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| name = X509_get_subject_name(info->x509); |
| dn = X509_NAME_oneline(name, name_buf, sizeof(name_buf)); |
| |
| ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s, |
| SSLPROXY_CERT_CB_LOG_FMT "%s, sending %s", |
| sc->vhost_id, msg, dn ? dn : "-uknown-"); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * caller will decrement the cert and key reference |
| * so we need to increment here to prevent them from |
| * being freed. |
| */ |
| #define modssl_set_cert_info(info, cert, pkey) \ |
| *cert = info->x509; \ |
| X509_reference_inc(*cert); \ |
| *pkey = info->x_pkey->dec_pkey; \ |
| EVP_PKEY_reference_inc(*pkey) |
| |
| int ssl_callback_proxy_cert(SSL *ssl, MODSSL_CLIENT_CERT_CB_ARG_TYPE **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey) |
| { |
| conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl); |
| server_rec *s = mySrvFromConn(c); |
| SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s); |
| X509_NAME *ca_name, *issuer; |
| X509_INFO *info; |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_list; |
| STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *certs = sc->proxy->pkp->certs; |
| int i, j; |
| |
| ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s, |
| SSLPROXY_CERT_CB_LOG_FMT "entered", |
| sc->vhost_id); |
| |
| if (!certs || (sk_X509_INFO_num(certs) <= 0)) { |
| ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_WARNING, 0, s, |
| SSLPROXY_CERT_CB_LOG_FMT |
| "downstream server wanted client certificate " |
| "but none are configured", sc->vhost_id); |
| return FALSE; |
| } |
| |
| ca_list = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl); |
| |
| if (!ca_list || (sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_list) <= 0)) { |
| /* |
| * downstream server didn't send us a list of acceptable CA certs, |
| * so we send the first client cert in the list. |
| */ |
| info = sk_X509_INFO_value(certs, 0); |
| |
| modssl_proxy_info_log(s, info, "no acceptable CA list"); |
| |
| modssl_set_cert_info(info, x509, pkey); |
| |
| return TRUE; |
| } |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_list); i++) { |
| ca_name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_list, i); |
| |
| for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_INFO_num(certs); j++) { |
| info = sk_X509_INFO_value(certs, j); |
| issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(info->x509); |
| |
| if (X509_NAME_cmp(issuer, ca_name) == 0) { |
| modssl_proxy_info_log(s, info, "found acceptable cert"); |
| |
| modssl_set_cert_info(info, x509, pkey); |
| |
| return TRUE; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s, |
| SSLPROXY_CERT_CB_LOG_FMT |
| "no client certificate found!?", sc->vhost_id); |
| |
| return FALSE; |
| } |
| |
| static void ssl_session_log(server_rec *s, |
| const char *request, |
| unsigned char *id, |
| unsigned int idlen, |
| const char *status, |
| const char *result, |
| long timeout) |
| { |
| char buf[SSL_SESSION_ID_STRING_LEN]; |
| char timeout_str[56] = {'\0'}; |
| |
| if (s->loglevel < APLOG_DEBUG) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if (timeout) { |
| apr_snprintf(timeout_str, sizeof(timeout_str), |
| "timeout=%lds ", (timeout - time(NULL))); |
| } |
| |
| ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s, |
| "Inter-Process Session Cache: " |
| "request=%s status=%s id=%s %s(session %s)", |
| request, status, |
| SSL_SESSION_id2sz(id, idlen, buf, sizeof(buf)), |
| timeout_str, result); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This callback function is executed by OpenSSL whenever a new SSL_SESSION is |
| * added to the internal OpenSSL session cache. We use this hook to spread the |
| * SSL_SESSION also to the inter-process disk-cache to make share it with our |
| * other Apache pre-forked server processes. |
| */ |
| int ssl_callback_NewSessionCacheEntry(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) |
| { |
| /* Get Apache context back through OpenSSL context */ |
| conn_rec *conn = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl); |
| server_rec *s = mySrvFromConn(conn); |
| SSLSrvConfigRec *sc = mySrvConfig(s); |
| long timeout = sc->session_cache_timeout; |
| BOOL rc; |
| unsigned char *id; |
| unsigned int idlen; |
| |
| /* |
| * Set the timeout also for the internal OpenSSL cache, because this way |
| * our inter-process cache is consulted only when it's really necessary. |
| */ |
| SSL_set_timeout(session, timeout); |
| |
| /* |
| * Store the SSL_SESSION in the inter-process cache with the |
| * same expire time, so it expires automatically there, too. |
| */ |
| id = SSL_SESSION_get_session_id(session); |
| idlen = SSL_SESSION_get_session_id_length(session); |
| |
| timeout += modssl_session_get_time(session); |
| |
| rc = ssl_scache_store(s, id, idlen, timeout, session); |
| |
| ssl_session_log(s, "SET", id, idlen, |
| rc == TRUE ? "OK" : "BAD", |
| "caching", timeout); |
| |
| /* |
| * return 0 which means to OpenSSL that the session is still |
| * valid and was not freed by us with SSL_SESSION_free(). |
| */ |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This callback function is executed by OpenSSL whenever a |
| * SSL_SESSION is looked up in the internal OpenSSL cache and it |
| * was not found. We use this to lookup the SSL_SESSION in the |
| * inter-process disk-cache where it was perhaps stored by one |
| * of our other Apache pre-forked server processes. |
| */ |
| SSL_SESSION *ssl_callback_GetSessionCacheEntry(SSL *ssl, |
| unsigned char *id, |
| int idlen, int *do_copy) |
| { |
| /* Get Apache context back through OpenSSL context */ |
| conn_rec *conn = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl); |
| server_rec *s = mySrvFromConn(conn); |
| SSL_SESSION *session; |
| |
| /* |
| * Try to retrieve the SSL_SESSION from the inter-process cache |
| */ |
| session = ssl_scache_retrieve(s, id, idlen); |
| |
| ssl_session_log(s, "GET", id, idlen, |
| session ? "FOUND" : "MISSED", |
| session ? "reuse" : "renewal", 0); |
| |
| /* |
| * Return NULL or the retrieved SSL_SESSION. But indicate (by |
| * setting do_copy to 0) that the reference count on the |
| * SSL_SESSION should not be incremented by the SSL library, |
| * because we will no longer hold a reference to it ourself. |
| */ |
| *do_copy = 0; |
| |
| return session; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This callback function is executed by OpenSSL whenever a |
| * SSL_SESSION is removed from the the internal OpenSSL cache. |
| * We use this to remove the SSL_SESSION in the inter-process |
| * disk-cache, too. |
| */ |
| void ssl_callback_DelSessionCacheEntry(SSL_CTX *ctx, |
| SSL_SESSION *session) |
| { |
| server_rec *s; |
| SSLSrvConfigRec *sc; |
| unsigned char *id; |
| unsigned int idlen; |
| |
| /* |
| * Get Apache context back through OpenSSL context |
| */ |
| if (!(s = (server_rec *)SSL_CTX_get_app_data(ctx))) { |
| return; /* on server shutdown Apache is already gone */ |
| } |
| |
| sc = mySrvConfig(s); |
| |
| /* |
| * Remove the SSL_SESSION from the inter-process cache |
| */ |
| id = SSL_SESSION_get_session_id(session); |
| idlen = SSL_SESSION_get_session_id_length(session); |
| |
| ssl_scache_remove(s, id, idlen); |
| |
| ssl_session_log(s, "REM", id, idlen, |
| "OK", "dead", 0); |
| |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* Dump debugginfo trace to the log file. */ |
| static void log_tracing_state(MODSSL_INFO_CB_ARG_TYPE ssl, conn_rec *c, |
| server_rec *s, int where, int rc) |
| { |
| /* |
| * create the various trace messages |
| */ |
| if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START) { |
| ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s, |
| "%s: Handshake: start", SSL_LIBRARY_NAME); |
| } |
| else if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE) { |
| ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s, |
| "%s: Handshake: done", SSL_LIBRARY_NAME); |
| } |
| else if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP) { |
| ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s, |
| "%s: Loop: %s", |
| SSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl)); |
| } |
| else if (where & SSL_CB_READ) { |
| ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s, |
| "%s: Read: %s", |
| SSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl)); |
| } |
| else if (where & SSL_CB_WRITE) { |
| ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s, |
| "%s: Write: %s", |
| SSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl)); |
| } |
| else if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) { |
| char *str = (where & SSL_CB_READ) ? "read" : "write"; |
| ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s, |
| "%s: Alert: %s:%s:%s", |
| SSL_LIBRARY_NAME, str, |
| SSL_alert_type_string_long(rc), |
| SSL_alert_desc_string_long(rc)); |
| } |
| else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT) { |
| if (rc == 0) { |
| ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s, |
| "%s: Exit: failed in %s", |
| SSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl)); |
| } |
| else if (rc < 0) { |
| ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, s, |
| "%s: Exit: error in %s", |
| SSL_LIBRARY_NAME, SSL_state_string_long(ssl)); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Because SSL renegotations can happen at any time (not only after |
| * SSL_accept()), the best way to log the current connection details is |
| * right after a finished handshake. |
| */ |
| if (where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE) { |
| ap_log_error(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_INFO, 0, s, |
| "Connection: Client IP: %s, Protocol: %s, " |
| "Cipher: %s (%s/%s bits)", |
| ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "REMOTE_ADDR"), |
| ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "SSL_PROTOCOL"), |
| ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "SSL_CIPHER"), |
| ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "SSL_CIPHER_USEKEYSIZE"), |
| ssl_var_lookup(NULL, s, c, NULL, "SSL_CIPHER_ALGKEYSIZE")); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * This callback function is executed while OpenSSL processes the SSL |
| * handshake and does SSL record layer stuff. It's used to trap |
| * client-initiated renegotiations, and for dumping everything to the |
| * log. |
| */ |
| void ssl_callback_Info(MODSSL_INFO_CB_ARG_TYPE ssl, int where, int rc) |
| { |
| conn_rec *c; |
| server_rec *s; |
| SSLConnRec *scr; |
| |
| /* Retrieve the conn_rec and the associated SSLConnRec. */ |
| if ((c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data((SSL *)ssl)) == NULL) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| if ((scr = myConnConfig(c)) == NULL) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| /* If the reneg state is to reject renegotiations, check the SSL |
| * state machine and move to ABORT if a Client Hello is being |
| * read. */ |
| if ((where & SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP) && scr->reneg_state == RENEG_REJECT) { |
| int state = SSL_get_state(ssl); |
| |
| if (state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A |
| || state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) { |
| scr->reneg_state = RENEG_ABORT; |
| ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR, 0, c, |
| "rejecting client initiated renegotiation"); |
| } |
| } |
| /* If the first handshake is complete, change state to reject any |
| * subsequent client-initated renegotiation. */ |
| else if ((where & SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE) && scr->reneg_state == RENEG_INIT) { |
| scr->reneg_state = RENEG_REJECT; |
| } |
| |
| s = mySrvFromConn(c); |
| if (s && s->loglevel >= APLOG_DEBUG) { |
| log_tracing_state(ssl, c, s, where, rc); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| /* |
| * This callback function is executed when OpenSSL encounters an extended |
| * client hello with a server name indication extension ("SNI", cf. RFC 4366). |
| */ |
| int ssl_callback_ServerNameIndication(SSL *ssl, int *al, modssl_ctx_t *mctx) |
| { |
| const char *servername = |
| SSL_get_servername(ssl, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); |
| |
| if (servername) { |
| conn_rec *c = (conn_rec *)SSL_get_app_data(ssl); |
| if (c) { |
| if (ap_vhost_iterate_given_conn(c, ssl_find_vhost, |
| (void *)servername)) { |
| ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c, |
| "SSL virtual host for servername %s found", |
| servername); |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
| } |
| else { |
| ap_log_cerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_DEBUG, 0, c, |
| "No matching SSL virtual host for servername " |
| "%s found (using default/first virtual host)", |
| servername); |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Find a (name-based) SSL virtual host where either the ServerName |
| * or one of the ServerAliases matches the supplied name (to be used |
| * with ap_vhost_iterate_given_conn()) |
| */ |
| static int ssl_find_vhost(void *servername, conn_rec *c, server_rec *s) |
| { |
| SSLSrvConfigRec *sc; |
| SSL *ssl; |
| BOOL found = FALSE; |
| apr_array_header_t *names; |
| int i; |
| SSLConnRec *sslcon; |
| |
| /* check ServerName */ |
| if (!strcasecmp(servername, s->server_hostname)) { |
| found = TRUE; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * if not matched yet, check ServerAlias entries |
| * (adapted from vhost.c:matches_aliases()) |
| */ |
| if (!found) { |
| names = s->names; |
| if (names) { |
| char **name = (char **)names->elts; |
| for (i = 0; i < names->nelts; ++i) { |
| if (!name[i]) |
| continue; |
| if (!strcasecmp(servername, name[i])) { |
| found = TRUE; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* if still no match, check ServerAlias entries with wildcards */ |
| if (!found) { |
| names = s->wild_names; |
| if (names) { |
| char **name = (char **)names->elts; |
| for (i = 0; i < names->nelts; ++i) { |
| if (!name[i]) |
| continue; |
| if (!ap_strcasecmp_match(servername, name[i])) { |
| found = TRUE; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* set SSL_CTX (if matched) */ |
| sslcon = myConnConfig(c); |
| if (found && (ssl = sslcon->ssl) && |
| (sc = mySrvConfig(s))) { |
| SSL_set_SSL_CTX(ssl, sc->server->ssl_ctx); |
| /* |
| * SSL_set_SSL_CTX() only deals with the server cert, |
| * so we need to duplicate a few additional settings |
| * from the ctx by hand |
| */ |
| SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_CTX_get_options(ssl->ctx)); |
| if ((SSL_get_verify_mode(ssl) == SSL_VERIFY_NONE) || |
| (SSL_num_renegotiations(ssl) == 0)) { |
| /* |
| * Only initialize the verification settings from the ctx |
| * if they are not yet set, or if we're called when a new |
| * SSL connection is set up (num_renegotiations == 0). |
| * Otherwise, we would possibly reset a per-directory |
| * configuration which was put into effect by ssl_hook_Access. |
| */ |
| SSL_set_verify(ssl, SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(ssl->ctx), |
| SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(ssl->ctx)); |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Save the found server into our SSLConnRec for later |
| * retrieval |
| */ |
| sslcon->server = s; |
| |
| /* |
| * There is one special filter callback, which is set |
| * very early depending on the base_server's log level. |
| * If this is not the first vhost we're now selecting |
| * (and the first vhost doesn't use APLOG_DEBUG), then |
| * we need to set that callback here. |
| */ |
| if (s->loglevel >= APLOG_DEBUG) { |
| BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), ssl_io_data_cb); |
| BIO_set_callback_arg(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), (void *)ssl); |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| #endif |