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<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 -->
# AGENTS.md
## Security
You are helping a security researcher find and report vulnerabilities in
Apache Santuario (XML Security for Java). Before drafting any report or reaching
any conclusion, complete these steps.
### Step 1 — Read the threat model
Read **[THREAT_MODEL.md](THREAT_MODEL.md)**: the trust boundary, the central
**secure validation** knob, the properties provided vs. left to the caller, and
the known non-findings.
### Step 2 — Read the security policy
Read **[SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md)** for how to report and the published
advisories.
### Key scoping facts (see THREAT_MODEL.md)
- The library verifies/decrypts **attacker-controlled XML**; the calling
application and its key-trust configuration are trusted.
- **Secure validation** mode is load-bearing: a finding that only manifests
with secure validation *off* is out of model (it is the trusted-input
posture) — see section 5a.
- The library does **not** decide **key trust** or **what the signature
covers**: certificate-path validation and **XML-Signature-Wrapping** coverage
checks are the caller's responsibility (sections 9/10). Route such findings
there.
- The retired C++ project and archived repos are out of scope.
### Then assess
Route the finding to exactly one disposition in **THREAT_MODEL.md section 13**,
citing the section. If it cannot be routed, it is a `MODEL-GAP` — surface it.