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juneau-rest-server

<p>
	Denial of service attacks can be alleviated through the {@link oajr.annotation.Rest#maxInput() maxInput()}
	setting.  Arbitrarily-large input will trigger an exception before causing out-of-memory errors.
	The default value for this setting is 100MB.  
</p>
<p>
	Since the parsers do not use intermediate DOMs and instead parse directly into Java objects,  
	deeply nested data structures will almost always trigger stack overflow errors long before memory consumption
	becomes an issue.  However, this is NOT true of the RDF parsers that use an intermediate DOM.  If parsing 
	RDF, you may want to consider lowering the max-input value above.
</p>