title: Security sidebar_position: 99 id: security license: | Licensed to the Apache Software Foundation (ASF) under one or more contributor license agreements. See the NOTICE file distributed with this work for additional information regarding copyright ownership. The ASF licenses this file to You under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the “License”); you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain a copy of the License at
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Use this page when a Rust reader accepts bytes from outside the application's trust boundary. Fory reconstructs application values; it does not authenticate the sender, protect transport integrity, or decide whether a valid value is authorized for a business operation.
Before deserialization:
Security-related configuration:
max_dyn_depth(...) to reject unexpectedly deep dynamic object graphs.max_graph_memory_bytes(...) at the fixed 128 MiB default for most inputs, or set a positive byte gate for trusted workloads with different legitimate collection/map/struct sizes.max_unbacked_container_items(...) at 8192 unless trusted compact codecs require a larger root allowance. Zero rejects every unbacked item.dyn Any or broad trait-object fields for untrusted input.Add negative tests for the boundary as well as normal round trips. Verify that the configured reader rejects unexpected application types, excessive nesting, resource-limit violations, and malformed input. After a failed read, verify that a valid root can still be read with the same Fory instance.
See Configuration for the complete option reference and Type Registration for the Fory registration API.