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title: Threat Model sidebar_position: 2

This document describes Apache Fory's project-level security boundaries and non-goals. It is the high-level entry point for Fory security models; concrete untrusted deserialization classification rules live in the deserialization security model.

Fory is an in-process serialization library. Applications link Fory into their own process, configure serializers and type policies, and call Fory APIs to serialize application-owned objects or deserialize encoded Fory data. Fory does not provide a standalone network service, daemon, authentication system, or transport protocol.

Fory can generate service companions for application-provided gRPC runtimes. Those companions provide Fory serialization for request and response objects; the application and gRPC stack still own listeners, channels, credentials, authentication, authorization, deadlines, retries, and transport lifecycle.

Trust Boundaries

Fory's primary security boundary is encoded bytes or streams passed to deserialization APIs from untrusted or partially trusted sources. The embedding application owns where those bytes come from and which Fory configuration, registered types, schemas, and policies are used to read them.

The adversary model for untrusted deserialization is a sender that can craft encoded bytes or stream behavior presented to a Fory read API. It does not assume the sender can change the embedding application's Fory configuration, registered type set, TypeChecker or equivalent allow-list policy, schema definitions, classloader, or other active policy objects unless the application itself exposes those controls.

Fory security boundaries include:

• Runtime safety, including avoiding crashes, panics, undefined behavior, and out-of-bounds memory access.
• Resource ownership, including memory, CPU progress, stream buffers, native allocations, callbacks, and retained read-side state.
• Explicit Fory policy checks, such as class, type, function, method, registration, or deserialization policies that restrict what may be materialized.
• Cleanup boundaries, where state created during a failed root operation must not leak into later operations.

Runtime serializer code generation and JIT compilation are not paths for executing encoded input. They operate on types and schemas after the active registration check, TypeChecker, schema check, or policy check has accepted the type surface. When class registration is disabled, TypeChecker or an equivalent allow-list policy is the relevant gate. Generated serializer code is derived from checked type descriptors rather than from attacker-controlled byte contents.

The deserialization security model defines how to classify these boundaries for untrusted deserialization paths.

Non-Goals

Fory does not provide:

• Encoded-data authenticity, integrity, confidentiality, signing, MACs, or encryption.
• Transport security or protection for bytes while they are stored or moved outside Fory, including transport security for generated service companions.
• Application-level authorization or validation for the business meaning of a successfully deserialized value.
• A sandbox for user-registered classes, functions, constructors, setters, finalizers, or other application-owned logic.

Applications that receive Fory data from untrusted sources should authenticate or integrity-check those bytes before passing them to Fory when authenticity or tamper resistance matters.

Downstream Responsibilities

Applications are responsible for:

• Choosing whether a byte source is trusted enough for the configured deserialization mode.
• Keeping class or type registration enabled for untrusted data unless another explicit Fory policy owns the accepted type surface.
• Registering only types and serializers that are safe for the application's trust boundary.
• Configuring depth and resource limits for the largest data shape the application intends to accept.
• Treating cross-language peers and schemas as part of the application's trust relationship.

Disabling registration or using dynamic deserialization on trusted data is a configuration choice. For untrusted data, bypassing an explicit Fory policy, crashing, leaking resources, retaining attacker-controlled state, or allocating disproportionately remains security-relevant as described in the deserialization security model.